Territoriality and Extraterritoriality: Coverage of Fair Employment Laws after EEOC v. ARAMCO by Yamakawa, Ryuichi
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 17 | Number 1 Article 5
Winter 1992
Territoriality and Extraterritoriality: Coverage of
Fair Employment Laws after EEOC v. ARAMCO
Ryuichi Yamakawa
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ryuichi Yamakawa, Territoriality and Extraterritoriality: Coverage of Fair Employment Laws after EEOC v. ARAMCO, 17 N.C. J. Int'l L.
& Com. Reg. 71 (1992).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol17/iss1/5
Territoriality and Extraterritoriality: Coverage of Fair Employment Laws
after EEOC v. ARAMCO
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This article is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/
ncilj/vol17/iss1/5
Territoriality and Extraterritoriality: Coverage of
Fair Employment Laws After EEOC v. ARAMCO
Ryuichi Yamakawa*
I. Introduction ........................................... 72
II. Extraterritoriality in International Law ................. 74
A. Extraterritoriality and Principles of Jurisdiction .... 74
1. Principles of Jurisdiction in International Law .. 74
2. Limits of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction ........... 77
B. Construction of Municipal Laws ................... 80
1. Role of International Law in Interpreting
M unicipal Laws ................................ 80
2. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality ......... 81
III. Extraterritoriality in Fair Employment Laws ............ 85
A. Fair Labor Standards Act/Equal Pay Act ........... 85
B. Age Discrimination in Employment Act ............ 88
1. Before 1984 Amendment ...................... 88
2. 1984 Amendment ............................. 91
C. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ........... 92
1. Lower Courts in Conflict ...................... 92
2. The Supreme Court in EEOC v. ARAMCO ...... 93
3. Analysis of the Court Opinion ................. 98
IV. Limits of Territorial and Extraterritorial Application of
Fair Employment Laws ................................ 103
A. Limits of Territorial Application: Applicability of
U.S. Territorial Laws to Employment Abroad ...... 103
1. Business Trip Abroad ......................... 103
2. Place of Decision Test ......................... 108
B. Limits of Extraterritorial Application ............... 112
Associate Professor of Law, Musashi University (Tokyo, Japan). LL.B. 1982, Uni-
versity of Tokyo; LL.M. 1991, University of Washington. Fulbright scholarship grantee,
1990-1991.
This Article is based on my research paper submitted for the master of laws course at
the University of Washington School of Law. I am very grateful to Professors Daniel
Bodansky, Daniel Foote, John Haley, and Dan Henderson for valuable comments on an
earlier draft of this Article. I also would like to thank Gary Born and Frederick Brown,
Esqs., both of whom kindly provided me with instructive materials on the subject, and
Cynthia Pevehouse, Esq., who made helpful suggestions on the manuscript of this Article.
Errors that remain are, of course, my own.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
1. Conflicts with Foreign Laws and Customs ...... 112
2. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification .......... 114
3. Foreign Compulsion ........................... 117
V . Conclusion ............................................ 118
I. Introduction
In today's global economy many U.S. corporations' are doing
business in foreign countries. Their labor and employment rela-
tions, traditionally local, now have an increasingly transnational set-
ting. This situation presents the question of the extraterritorial
application of U.S. fair employment laws. Although the applicability
of U.S. laws abroad has long been discussed in such fields as antitrust
and securities, 2 it is only recently that the coverage of fair employ-
ment laws outside the territorial U.S. has become a frequently de-
bated issue. 3
Recently, the United States Supreme Court rejected the extra-
territorial applicability of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 in
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO). 5 Title VII makes it un-
lawful for an employer to discriminate against its employees on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The Court left
open several important questions,6 among them the distinction be-
tween the territorial and extraterritorial application of domestic laws.
With respect to statutes such as the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act 7 that do have extraterritorial reach, the limits placed on
their extraterritorial application are a significant issue, particularly
when they conflict with foreign laws and customs.
This Article analyzes the geographical coverage of U.S. fair em-
I This Article refers to a "U.S. corporation" as a corporation that was incorporated
under laws of the United States. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
2 See generally EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO (C.
Olmstead ed., 1984); THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWs (Dieter
Lange & Gary Born eds., 1987); ALAN D. NEAL & MEL L. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL Busi-
NESS AND NATIONALJURISDICTION (1988); WILBUR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE
ANTITRUST LAws (4th ed. 1991).
3 Case law developed relatively early in labor relations laws. Both the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197
(1988), and the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988), have been denied extra-
territorial reach. See, e.g., Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957)
(the Labor Management Relations Act does not apply to an American union's organization
of foreign seamen on foreign vessels); RCA OMS, Inc., 202 NLRB Dec. 228 (1973) (em-
ployees working on foreign soils are not covered by the National Labor Relations Act); Air
Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 849 (1951) (the Railway Labor Act does not apply to the employees of American air
carriers working outside the United States).
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17) (1988).
5 111 S.Ct. 1227 (1991).
6 One of the important policy questions left open in AR.AMCO is whether Congress
should amend Title VII to extend its coverage abroad. This Article does not address this
issue.
7 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
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ployment laws. As this issue is closely connected to the limits of leg-
islative or prescriptive jurisdiction in international law, Part II of this
Article briefly addresses issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction in gen-
eral. After introducing the principles and limits ofjurisdiction in in-
ternational law, Part II examines the presumption against
extraterritoriality as a canon of interpretation of municipal statutes
and points out that there are two distinct presumptions which have
different doctrinal bases and strengths. Part III of this Article ana-
lyzes the coverage of major fair employment legislation-the Equal
Pay Act as a part of the Fair Labor Standards Act,8 the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, and Title VII. 9 This Article analyzes the
AR/AMCO case in considerable detail and examines some of the
problems found in the Supreme Court's opinion. Finally, Part IV
discusses the limits of territorial as well as extraterritorial application
of these statutes. Two types of situations are suggested in which ter-
ritorial U.S. laws apply to employment relations between employers
in the United States and their employees working in foreign coun-
tries: (1) the situation in which employees are working at extended
U.S. workplaces, and (2) the situation in which decisions over termi-
nation and hiring of employees who are working or supposed to
work abroad are made in U.S. territory.' 0 Next, the availability of
defenses resulting from the conflicts between extraterritorial U.S.
laws and territorial foreign laws and customs is discussed with regard
to limits of extraterritorial application. This Article suggests that de-
fenses based on bona fide occupational qualifications and foreign
compulsion are available for employers in the United States under
certain limited circumstances.
In the analysis in Part IV, this Article examines the necessity for
and result of the application of U.S. fair employment laws, with refer-
ence to Japanese laws that do or do not apply to employment rela-
tions between U.S.-based corporations in Japan and their employees.
This issue is of great interest because ever-increasing numbers of
U.S. corporations are doing business in Japan.
8 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988). This Act obligates employers to pay overtime and
minimum wages, and regulates the employment of children under 18 years of age.
9 The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990)), which takes effect in 1992, does not contain
a provision indicating Congress' intent to apply it abroad. The Court in ARAMCO implied
that the Americans With Disabilities Act does not have extraterritorial coverage. EEOC v.
ARAMCO, 1 I I S.Ct. 1227, 1231-32 (1991) (citing this Act in stating that a broad defini-
tional language as to "commerce" or "employer" may not be a basis for extraterritorial
jurisdiction).
10 After ARAMCO, a bill was introduced to amend Title VII to extend its coverage to
foreign countries. See infra note 301 and accompanying text. But until the amendment
becomes law, the limits on the territorial application of Title VII remains an important
issue.
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II. Extraterritoriality in International Law
A. Extraterritoriality and Principles of Jurisdiction
1. Principles ofJurisdiction in International Law
The extraterritorial application of national laws raises the question
of whether the principles of jurisdiction in international law are vio-
lated. Jurisdiction in the context of international law is the "legal
power or competence of states to exercise governmental func-
tions."" Depending on the nature of the governmental functions to
be exercised, jurisdiction can be classified into one of three catego-
ries: jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to adjudicate, and juris-
diction to enforce.12 Jurisdiction to prescribe is the power of a state
to "make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of
persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by legislation,
by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by
determination of a court."' 3 Jurisdiction to adjudicate is the power
to "subject persons or things to the process of courts or administra-
tive tribunals" of the state. 14 Finally, jurisdiction to enforce is the
state's power to "induce or compel compliance or to punish non-
compliance with its laws or regulations."' t5 The issue of extraterrito-
riality arises, in many cases, around jurisdiction to prescribe, since
this issue is often related to the state's scheme to regulate or pre-
scribe certain conduct beyond its territorial boundaries.
a. Tertitorial Principle
A state has prescriptive jurisdiction over conduct that takes
place within its territory. 16 Based on the sovereignty of states, this
territorial principle is the traditional and common basis for jurisdic-
tion to prescribe. 17 Sometimes the conduct to be prescribed occurs
partly outside the territory of the regulating state. In such a case, the
territorial principle can be extended in two directions. First, when
the conduct commences within a state but is completed outside its
territory, the state can prescribe the conduct based on the "subjec-
tive territorial principle."' 8 The Restatement (Second) of the For-
eign Relations Law of the United States gives an example: "X hides
a bomb aboard a plane in state A. The bomb explodes while the
11 MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAW 241-42 (1988).
12 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 401 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
17 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402(1)(a). See also F.A. Mann, The Doctrine ofJurisdiction
in International Law, 111 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 30 (1964).
18 Harvard Research in International Law,Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM.
J. INT'L L. Supp. 435, 484 (1935).
[VOL. 17
1992] EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF EMPLOYMENT LAWS 75
plane is flying over state B, causing the plane to crash, killing all the
passengers. A has jurisdiction to prescribe a criminal penalty for
homicide."' 19
Second, when the conduct commences abroad but is completed
within the territory of a state, the state can prescribe such conduct
under the "objective territorial principle."'20 The decision of the
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case 2' invoked
this principle. In this case, Turkey asserted its criminal jurisdiction
over the collision of French and Turkish vessels on the high seas, as a
result of which Turkish nationals were killed and their vessel sank.
The court held that where the negligence of a French officer on the
French vessel caused the harm to the Turkish vessel, which is treated
as Turkish territory, international law did not prohibit the Turkish
government from applying its criminal law to prosecute the officer.22
In this case, the "effects" of the negligent conduct of the French of-
ficer can be recognized without difficulty. However, U.S. courts have
relied on more vague or intangible "effects," such as effects on the
national economy within its territory, as a basis for jurisdiction over
conduct abroad. This is called the effects doctrine. 23
b. Effects Doctrine ,
The landmark U.S. case that established the effects doctrine is
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (ALCOA). 24 The dispute in this
case was whether agreements by which foreign corporations doing
business abroad set up quotas for production of aluminum violated
the Sherman Act 25 when the aluminum was to be exported to the
United States. Judge Learned Hand stated that the Sherman Act
may regulate conduct outside the United States if such conduct was
intended to and did have some effects upon imports to the United
States. 26 Since ALCOA, a number of U.S. courts have relied on the
effects doctrine in areas such as antitrust and securities regulations. 27
As a result, the 1909 Supreme Court decision in American Banana Co.
19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 17, illus. 1 (1965).
20 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402(1)(c).
21 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10.
22 Id. at 38-39.
23 The effects doctrine is usually classified as a different category from the territorial
principle. E.g. ,JANIS, supra note 11, at 245. But some authorities treat the effects doctrine
as a part of the objective territorial principle. E.g., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
24 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
25 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
26 148 F.2d at 443- 44.
27 See generally Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Pre-
sumption against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U.L. REV. 598, 611 (1990). But subsequent deci-
sions have often required "substantial" or "material" effects for the exercise of U.S.
antitrust jurisdiction. See FUGATE, supra note 2, at 76-78.
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v. United Fruit Co. ,28 which expressed a strict territorial principle for
the Sherman Act, has lost much of its vitality.29 The Restatement
(Third) has also adopted the effects doctrine, stating that a state has
prescriptive jurisdiction over conduct outside its territory that has or
is intended to have substantial effects within its territory.30
However, the effects doctrine has received unfavorable re-
sponses from foreign countries whose laws are in conflict with U.S.
laws. Relying on the traditional territorial principle, foreign com-
mentators have criticized this doctrine.3 1 Moreover, some states
have shown resistance to U.S. extraterritorial economic regulations
based on the effects doctrine. For example, the United Kingdom has
asserted the invalidity of the effects doctrine through diplomatic doc-
uments,3 2 and has submitted amicus curiae briefs in U.S. antitrust
cases.3 3 The United Kingdom has also enacted "blocking statutes,"
which empower the government to prohibit its nationals from obey-
ing orders under foreign laws to submit documents in their posses-
sion.34 On the other hand, other states such as Germany and the
European Community have themselves adopted the effects doc-
trine.3 5 In any event, it has been widely recognized that some mea-
sure is necessary to resolve conflicting interests between states
involved in extraterritorial regulations.3 6
c. Nationality Principle
The nationality principle is a basis for prescriptive jurisdiction
by a state over its nationals, whether they are within its territory or
not. Based on the idea that nationality is a mark of allegiance and
one aspect of sovereignty, this principle, along with the territorial
principle, has long been accepted in the United States as well as in
other states.37 For example, ih Blackmer v. United States,38 the
Supreme Court upheld U.S. jurisdiction based on this principle over
28 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
29 See W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 110 S.Ct. 701, 705
(1990) (stating that the holding of American Banana was "substantially overruled" by Conti-
nental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962)). See generally Fu-
GATE, supra note 2, at 56-78.
30 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402(1)(c).
31 E.g., Mann, supra note 17, at 42.
32 See, e.g., Correspondence Concerning the United States Export Administration Act
and Anti Boycott Regulations 1977-1981, reprinted in EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 147
(A.V. Lowe ed., 1983).
33 E.g., Amicus curiae brief submitted by British Government during the Uranium
Antitrust litigation, 3 August 1979, reprinted in part in id. at 156.
34 Protection of Trade Interest Act of 1980 § 1(2) (Eng.).
35 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402, reporter's note 2.
36 For example, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of the effects
doctrine has been subject to the reasonableness test described below. See infra notes 46-62
and accompanying text.
37 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 363 (3d ed. 1979).
38 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
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an American citizen residing abroad who failed to respond to a sub-
poena issued and served by a U.S. court.39 To define the nationality
of corporations, U.S. law has generally treated the place of incorpo-
ration as determinative. 40 Thus, a corporation has the nationality of
the state in which it is incorporated.
d. Other Principles
It is argued that a state may exercise its jurisdiction over an
event which harms its nationals even if the event occurs outside its
territory. This is called the passive personality principle. Although
this principle has been increasingly recognized in anti-terrorist legis-
lation, including that of the United States,4 ' it has generally not been
accepted as a basis for jurisdiction with respect to ordinary crimes or
other conduct.42
Also, a state may exercise its jurisdiction to prescribe, under
what is called the protective principle, with respect to certain con-
duct that threatens the security of a state or the integrity of its gov-
ernmental functions even when the conduct is carried out by foreign
nationals outside the state.43 This principle affords a basis for pun-
ishment of a limited class of crimes such as espionage, falsification of
official documents, and perjury before consular officials. 44 Finally,
the universality principle provides a basis for punishing certain activ-
ities, such as piratical operation, so universally condemned that any
state has an interest in imposing punishment.45
2. Limits of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
a. Reasonableness Test
Some jurisdictional principles, such as nationality, effects on ter-
ritory, protection of state's security, and universality, provide a basis
for extraterritorial application of national laws. 46 However, the exer-
cise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by one state might affect another
state's interests, even if it does not violate international law. For ex-
ample, an international cartel agreement that is illegal under U.S.
antitrust laws may be permissible under the laws of the country
where the cartel agreement was entered into. Even if the United
39 Id. at 437.
40 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 213.
41 See Section 1202 of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of
1986. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1990).
42 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402 cmt. g; Mann, supra note 17, at 39-40.
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402(3) & cmt. f.
44 d.
45 Id. § 404.
46 If the definition of"extraterritorial application" includes the application of munici-
pal laws to events which only partly occur within a state's territory, the objective and sub-
jective territorial principles, which would justify such an application, can also be a basis for
extraterritoriality.
1992]
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States may exercise its prescriptive jurisdiction in this situation, rely-
ing on the effects that the cartel would have on U.S. territory, such
extraterritorial regulations may undermine the policies and interests
of the foreign country's own market regulation. Moreover, it may
bring about diplomatic and political tension between the two coun-
tries.47  Thus, some limitation on extraterritoriality becomes
necessary.
The Restatement (Third) has adopted a reasonableness test for
this purpose.48 Section 403(1) states that "[elven when one of the
bases for jurisdiction under section 402 is present, a state may not
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or ac-
tivity having connection with another state when the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable. ' 49 Subsection (2) lists the elements for
determining reasonableness in this respect. 50 In Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America National Trust & Saving Ass'n,5 1 the Ninth Circuit
adopted a similar approach when it addressed the issue of whether
the Sherman Act applies to an alleged conspiracy abroad which in-
terfered with the U.S. import of lumber from Honduras. Noting that
the effect on U.S. commerce alone is not sufficient for the exercise of
its extraterritorial jurisdiction, the court balanced various factors
similar to those listed for the reasonableness test under the Restate-
ment (Third).52 The notion of comity led the court to consider other
47 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
48 Some commentators seem to classify the reasonableness test as another principle
of jurisdiction, not as its limitation. See, e.g., THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NA-
TIONAL LAWS, supra note 2, at 38.
49 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403(1).
50 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403(2) states:
(2) Whether exercise ofjurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable
is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropri-
ate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial,
direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation
is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regula-
tion to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is gener-
ally accepted;
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal,
or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
51 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
52 Id. at 613-14.
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nations' interests under this approach. 53 Several decisions have fol-
lowed Timberlane,54 but commentators have doubted that this test is
an established international law principle. 55
The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a state, even when
reasonable in itself, may conflict with another state's jurisdiction
based on principles such as territoriality.5 6 Section 403(3) of the Re-
statement (Third) has adopted a balancing approach to resolve such
conflicts. 57 Under this approach, a state should evaluate its own in-
terest as well as the interests of other states in exercising its jurisdic-
tion in light of factors listed in subsection (2). Furthermore, if it is
clear that another state's interest is greater, the acting state should
defer to the exercise of jurisdiction by that other state. One of the
defects in this approach is the difficulty of balancing interests. It is
especially difficult for domestic courts to evaluate another state's in-
terest.5 8 Moreover, under this approach courts are required. to eval-
uate political factors, such as the importance of the regulation to the
international political order, without appropriate guidelines. 59 In
this situation domestic courts might be compelled to make their own
foreign policies for their country. 60 Some courts have declined to
adopt this approach, 6 ' but other courts have relied on it.62
53 Id. at 611-12.
54 E.g., Mannington Mills, Inc., v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir.
1979); Montreal Trading Co. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1001 (1982).
55 JANIS, supra note 11, at 258; David J. Gerber, Beyond Balancing: International Law
Restraints on the Reach of National Laws, 10 YALEJ. INT'L L. 185, 192 (1984). The Timberlane
decision relied on comity, not on international law norm, for its reasonableness test.
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 612.
56 Such a conflict ofjurisdiction occurs when what one state requires is prohibited by
another state. However, if one state requires what another state does not prohibit and it is
possible to comply with both regulations, there is no conflict ofjurisdiction. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 403, comment e, states that this situation is governed by the reasonableness
principle set forth in subsection (2), not by subsection (3).
5 7 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) provides:
When more than one state has a reasonable basis for exercising jurisdic-
tion over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by two or more states are
in conflict, each state is expected to evaluate its own as well as the other
state's interest in exercising jusisdicion in light of all the relevant factors,
including those set out in Subsection (2); and to defer to the other state if
that state's interest is greater.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403(3).
58 Gerber, supra note 55, at 205; Harold G. Maier, Extratemyitorial Jurisdiction at a Cross-
roads: An Intersection Between Public And Private International Law, 76 Am. J. INT'L L. 280, 317
(1982); Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1324 (1985).
59 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403(2)(e).
60 See Thomas W. Dunfee & Aryeh S. Friedman, The Extra-Territorial Applications of U.S.
Antitrust Laws: A Proposal for an Interim Solution, 45 OHIO ST. LJ. 883, 906 (1985).
61 E.g., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
62 E.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d
597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979).
1992]
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b. Foreign Compulsion Defense
With all the limitations stated above, jurisdictions of two or
more countries may still overlap. Thus, when one state requires con-
duct by a person which would result in violation of the laws of an-
other state, that person is presented with a serious dilemma. But, it
is recognized that a U.S. citizen caught in such a dilemma may raise
the defense that such illegal conduct was compelled under the laws
of the foreign country where it was carried out. 63 The Restatement
(Third) also recognizes this foreign compulsion defense.64
Case law has required actual compulsion for the establishment
of this defense: neither mere approval 65 nor authorization 66 by the
foreign government is sufficient. The defendant should make a rea-
sonable effort to avoid a violation of foreign laws.6 7 The defendant
must also prove that the violation of a foreign law would result in
severe sanctions, either criminal or civil. 68 Finally, this defense is
generally available only when the conduct in question was carried
out or will be carried out within the territory of the country that com-
pelled or would compel the conduct. 69
B. Construction of Municipal Laws
1. Role of International Law in Interpreting Municipal Laws
Whether a specific U.S. statute applies to conduct outside of
U.S. territory is a question of the interpretation of that statute within
the U.S. domestic legal system. It does not directly depend on the
question of whether an exercise of such extraterritorial jurisdiction
violates international law. Because Congress has power to override
international law, a statute that fails to meet such requirements is not
void in itself.70 Thus, even if a statute with extraterritorial reach has
63 Although many courts have accepted this principle in dicta, there are few decisions
which have held that otherwise illegal activities were permissible under this principle. See,
e.g., Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texas Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del.
1970).
64 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 441(1) states:
(A] state may not require a person ... to do an act in another state that is
prohibited by the law of that state or by the law of the state of which he is a
national ... or ... to refrain from doing an act in another state that is re-
quired by the law of that state or by the law of state of which he is a national.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 441(1).
65 Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1293.
66 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07
(1962).
67 See Comments, Strangers in a Strange Land: Foreign Compulsion and the Extraterritorial
Application of United States Employment Law, II Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 371, 385 (1990) [here-
inafter Comments, Foreign Compulsion].
68 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 441 cmt. c. See United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396
F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1968) ("mere absence of criminal sanctions abroad [does not] nec-
essarily mandate obedience to a subpoena [issued by U.S. courts]").
69 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 441 cmt. b.
70 E.g., South Afr. Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
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an insufficient jurisdictional basis in international law, it may still be
valid in a domestic legal system, although breach of international law
would expose the state to international liability. 7'
However, Chief Justice Marshall, in Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy, 72 set forth an important canon of statutory construction: "[a]n
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations, if any other possible construction remains." s73 The Restate-
ment (Third) also provides that "where fairly possible, a United
States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with interna-
tional law or an international agreement of the United States." 74
This is known as the Charming Betsy principle, which is said to be
based on the notion of international comity. According to one U.S.
Supreme Court decision, the observance of this principle is "essen-
tial to the peace and harmony of nations, and it should not be as-
sumed that Congress proposed to violate the obligations of this
country to other nations."' 75 Thus, in interpreting the geographical
coverage of a U.S. statute, courts should avoid constructions which
would violate jurisdictional principles of international law, 76 as long
as other constructions are possible or at least fairly possible.
2. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
a. Bases for Presumption
In Blackmer v. United States,77 which addressed the issue of the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts over an American citizen abroad with re-
spect to the enforcement of a subpoena, the Supreme Court held
that "the legislation of Congress, unless the contrary intent appears,
is construed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States." 78 Although the Court in Blackmer found congres-
sional intent for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, a series
of subsequent decisions have rejected the extraterritorial application
896 (1987). See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic
Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1163 (1990) ("the courts of the United States
generally have accepted the power of Congress to override the requirements of interna-
tional law and have sustained the domestic validity of such statutes when Congress ex-
presses its intent to do so"). However, one commentator suggests that the United States
Constitution, especially the due process clause in the Fifth Amendment, limits, and there-
fore may render void, the extraterritorial U.S. laws. Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Ap-
plication of American Law: Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. (no.3) 11 (1987).
71 Steinhardt, supra note 70, at 1128.
72 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
73 Id. at 118.
74 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 114.
75 MacLeod v. U.S., 229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913). However, Professor Steinhardt points
out that the Charming Betsy decision did not invoke comity. Steinhardt, supra note 70, at
1138.
76 See supra notes 16-45 and accompanying text.
77 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
78 Id. at 437.
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of U.S. statutes, relying on the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity. 79 Thus, this presumption has come to be treated as a "long-
standing principle of American law." 80 To support the presumption,
courts have often relied on the Charming Betsy principle, stating that
statutes should not be construed to violate international law if any
other possible construction remains. 8'
There is another basis for the presumption against extraterrito-
riality, however. Even when a state may exercise its prescriptive ju-
risdiction without violating international law, the state, through
legislative discretion, usually limits the coverage of the statute to its
own territory. In Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo,82 the Supreme Court indi-
cated that another basis for the presumption is "the assumption that
the Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions"83
when it engages in legislation. This assumption should be distin-
guished from the Charming Betsy principle, because it derives from
congressional concern for domestic matters and not from inter-
national law.8 4 Thus, the Court in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,85 while
acknowledging that there was no international law question in apply-.
ing the Lanham Trade-Mark Act 86 to the conduct of U.S. nationals
abroad based on the nationality principle, still addressed and
79 E.g., Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); Lauritzen v. Larsen,
345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953). See also Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138,
147 (1957); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-
22 (1963); Airline Dispatchers Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685, 690 (D.C.
Cir. 1951). However, Professor Turley points out that there is some difference in reliance
on this principle depending on the subject matter of legislation. See Turley, supra note 27,
at 603-37 (arguing that courts have applied a less stringent presumption concerning mar-
ket legislations like antitrust or security regulation than labor and environmental
legislations).
80 EEOC v. ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991).
81 E.g., Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 295; Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 578 (1953); McCulloch, 372
U.S. at 21. McCulloch expressly refers to an international law principle. Id. See also Stein-
hardt, supra note 70, at 1140. Courts have also relied on the Charming Betsy principle in
order to avoid statutory interpretations which would raise constitutional questions. E.g.,
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979). Justice Marshall's dissent-
ing opinion in ARAMCO suggests that the separation-of-powers doctrine may be another
basis for the Charming Betsy principle, stating that "[t]he strictness of the McCulloch and Benz
presumption permits the Court to avoid, if possible, the separation-of-powers and interna-
tional-comity questions ...... ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. at 1239.
82 336 U.S. at 281.
83 d. at 285. Since this case was concerned with the liability of U.S. contractors for
overtime wages under the Eight Hours Law, ch. 174, 37 Stat. 137 (1912) (repealed 1962),
which were claimed by their employees who worked in Iraq and Iran, the application of the
Eight Hours Law has its basis in the nationality principle. See supra notes 37-40 and ac-
companying text.
84 See Turley, supra note 27, at 606-07; Gary Z. Nothstein &Jeffrey P. Ayres, The Mul-
tinational Corporation and the Extraterritorial Application of the Labor Management Relations Act, 10
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 1, 27 (1976).
85 344 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1952). In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
Lanham Trade-Mark Act applied to a U.S. citizen who engaged in the infringement of a
trade mark registered under U.S. law, even when the infringement took place in Mexico.
86 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
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answered affirmatively the question of whether there is congressional
intent sufficient to rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality.8 7
b. Strength of Presumption
Taken literally, the holding of the Charming Betsy case leads to a
very strong presumption against extraterritoriality: if a statute is in-
terpreted to apply beyond U.S. territory and the exercise of such ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction would violate international law principles,
such interpretation ought to be avoided unless no other interpreta-
tion is "possible" or at least "fairly possible."188 Some courts require
statutory language that expressly indicates extraterritoriality.8 9
However, other courts look to legislative history for evidence of con-
gressional intent for extraterritoriality, because legislative history
may be relevant in deciding whether there is a "fairly possible" inter-
pretation consistent with principles of international law.90 But, the
inference needs to be so strong that a court can safely say that no
other "fairly possible" construction remains.
One of the decisions that relied on this presumption is McCulloch
v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras.9' In this case, the
Supreme Court held that there must be an "affirmative intention of
87 The presumption based on the Charming Betsy principle is sometimes distinguished
from the presumption against extraterritoriality, and classified as a separate category
under statutory construction. Boureslan v. ARAMCO, 892 F.2d 1271, 1275 n.l (5th Cir.
1990) (King, J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom., EEOC v. ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. 1227; ARAMCO,
111 S.Ct. at 1239 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see Steinhardt, supra note 70, at 1140-43;
Turley, supra note 27, at 606. Apart from categorization, it is important to note the differ-
ence in the basis for these presumptions.
88 Under RESTATEMENT (THIRD), section 114, the "fair possibility" would be required.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
89 E.g., Boureslan v. ARAMCO, 857 F.2d 1014, 1019 (5th Cir. 1989) (requiring
"clear expression of congressional intent"), aff'd en banc, 892 F.2d 1271, aff'd sub na.,
EEOC v. ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. 1227. See also ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. at 1238 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (the strong presumption would "foreclose inquiry into extrinsic guides to
interpretation").
90 The Supreme Court in McCulloch looked into the legislative history. See infra note
94 and accompanying text. Moreover, where the Court relies on the Charming Betsy princi-
ple in order to avoid the issue of the constitutionality of a statute (see supra note 81), it
explored the legislative history of the statute at issue. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.
v. Florida Gulf Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 583-88 (1988) (rejecting an
interpretation that handbilling to urge customers of a shopping mall to boycott neutral
employers violates section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, because such an interpretation would
raise a serious issue of First Amendment violation). Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion
in EEOC v. ARAMCO cites Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989), as a precedent that
rejected inquiry into extrinsic materials for Congress' intent under the stronger presump-
tion. Aramco, I ll S.Ct. at 1238. But the issue in that case is whether a federal statute may
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the Court in Dellmuth stated that
Congress may abrogate the states' immunity "only by making its intention clear in the
language of the statute." Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 228 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scan-
lon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). Thus the reliance on Dellmuth is misplaced.
91 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
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the Congress clearly expressed" 92 in order to rebut the presumption
based on international law. Faced with the issue of whether the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act applied to a foreign flag ship employing
alien seamen when the ship was in U.S. waters, the Court relied on
the "well established rule of international law that the law of the flag
state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship."93 Since it
failed to find any such clear expression in the language of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act or its legislative history,94 the Court re-
fused to extend the coverage of the Act to the foreign flag ship.
On the other hand, the presumption based only on the congres-
sional concern for domestic matters is not as strong as the presump-
tion based on the Charming Betsy principle. This is because the need
to avoid international law violations, which underlies the latter pre-
sumption, is not involved in the former presumption. Thus, the for-
mer presumption can be rebutted using "conventional techniques of
statutory interpretation, ' 95 by inferring that Congress intended to
apply the statute beyond U.S. territory, and without being forced to
choose other possible interpretations which would avoid the viola-
tion of international law principles.
A case that illustrates this is Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell.96 In
this case, certain U.S. citizens were employed by U.S. corporations
which had contracted to work for the U.S. government on a Bermuda
base. The base was obtained by the United States under a lease
agreement with the British government. The employees brought
suit against their employers under section 216(b) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA or the Act) for recovery of overtime compensa-
tion for their overseas work. Thus, the question was whether the
FLSA applied to employers doing business on the Bermuda base.
The coverage of the FLSA was determined with reference to com-
merce "among several States or from any States to any place outside
thereof."'97 "State" in turn means "any State of the United States or
the District of Columbia or any Territory or possession of the United
States." 98 Therefore, the question turns on whether "possession of
92 Id. at 21-22.
93 Id. at 21. For the international law principle that the flag state may exercise its
jurisdiction over the internal affairs of the ship, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 502.
94 McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 19.
95 ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. at 1237 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also states
that "a court is not free to invoke the [weaker] presumption ... until it has exhausted all
available indicia of Congress' intent" on the issue of extraterritoriality. Id. at 1240.
Although his understanding that the presumption on the basis of the Charming Betsy princi-
ple excludes the inquiry into legislative history may overstate the strength of this presump-
tion, the "conventional technique of statutory interpretation" may not be invoked under
this strong presumption against extraterritoriality.
96 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
97 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1988).
98 Id. § 203(c).
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the United States" includes U.S. leaseholds such as the Bermuda
base.
The Court, relying primarily on Blackmer v. United States,99 ac-
knowledged at the outset the general principle that the United States
has the power to regulate the conduct of its citizens abroad. 100 The
FLSA contained no clear expression of its applicability to conduct
that occurred on foreign soils, including foreign military bases, and
the legislative history was also silent on this issue. However, the
Court inferred' 01 congressional intent to apply the Act in such an
instance as this based on the fact that the Act had been applied to
U.S. territories like Puerto Rico, Guam, and Samoa, which, like the
Bermuda base, have their own local economies, 10 2 as long as the
United States has the power to control their labor relations. Noting
that the provisions of the lease agreement with the British govern-
ment indicate that the United States does have such power, the
Court concluded that the FLSA applied to employment on the Ber-
muda base. ' 03
In sum, the strength of the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity varies according to the basis for the presumption: jurisdictional
principles of international law or Congress' concern with domestic
matters. Therefore, when interpreting the geographical coverage of
a statute, courts must determine the basis and strength of the pre-
sumption under the statute.
III. Extraterritoriality in Fair Employment Laws
In analyzing the geographical coverage of fair employment laws,
this Article discusses three basic statutes. The FLSA, and therefore
the Equal Pay Act, contains a statutory provision that exempts for-
eign workplaces from its regulation. On the other hand, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was amended in 1984 to
have a certain extraterritorial reach. Finally, Title VII, which has an
ambiguous provision that exempts aliens employed abroad, was de-
nied extraterritoriality by the U.S. Supreme Court.
A. Fair Labor Standards Act/ Equal Pay Act
The Equal Pay Act, which prohibits wage discrimination on the
basis of sex, was enacted in 1963 as a part of the FLSA. While no
99 284 U.S. 421 (1932). This is a leading case for the nationality principle. See supra
notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
100 Connell, 335 U.S. at 381.
1l The Court stated that "our duty as a Court is to construe the word 'possession' as
our judgment instructs us the lawmakers, within constitutional limits, would have done
had they acted at the time of legislation with the present situation in mind." Id. at 388.
102 d. at 383, 388.
103 In 1957, Congress amended the FLSA to exclude extraterritorial applicability. See
infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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decision has been reported on the extraterritoriality of the Equal Pay
Act, case law under the FLSA provides a relevant source for inter-
preting the geographical coverage of the Equal Pay Act.
Before its amendment in 1957, the FLSA had limited extraterri-
torial reach with respect to the "possessions" of the United States.
As stated above,' 0 4 the Supreme Court in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Con-
nell 105 held that the FLSA applied to employment relations between
U.S. employers and their American employees on a Bermuda mili-
tary base. In 1957, however, Congress amended the FLSA to over-
rule this decision and specifically exclude the possibility of its
extraterritorial application by adding section 213(0.106 This section
provides that the FLSA shall not apply "with respect to any em-
ployee whose services during the workweek are performed in a work-
place within a foreign country."' 07 The consideration that led
Congress to add this provision was that applying the FLSA to foreign
countries would distort their local economies, which operate on a
different scale than the U.S. economy.10 8 For example, paying mini-
mum wages as provided by the FLSA may result in paying local work-
ers wages several times higher than the local standard, drawing them
away from other vital jobs in those areas.' 0 9 In addition, concern
was expressed about possible political problems with foreign govern-
ments as a result of such distortion." 0
However, this amendment raised the issue of what are the "serv-
ices ... performed in a workplace within a foreign country."' "t t In
Wirtz v. Healy," 2 the District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois held that this exemption provision was inapplicable to a tour
escort of a U.S. travel agency who spent a part of the workweek in
the United States and the rest of the workweek in Canada escorting
tours,' 3 while another escort who performed all of his services dur-
ing any workweek exclusively in a foreign country came within the
104 See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
105 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
1o6 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (1988).
107 The entire subsection reads as follows:
(f) The provisions of section 6, 7, 11, and 12 [29 U. S. C. 206, 207, 211,
212] shall not apply with respect to any employee whose services during the
workweek are performed in a workplace within a foreign country or within
territory under the jurisdiction of the United States other than the following:
a State of the United States; the District of Columbia; Puerto Rico; the Virgin
Islands; outer Continental Shelf lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462); American Samoa; Guam; Wake Island;
Eniwetok Atoll; Kwajalein Atoll; Johnston Island; and the Canal Zone.
Id.
108 S. REP. No.' 987, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1756, 1756-57.
109 Id. at 1757.
IO Id.
11' 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (1988).
112 227 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
113 Id. at 129.
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exemption provision.' 4 On the other hand, in Hodgson v. Union de
Permisionarios Circulo," 5 the District Court for the Southern District
of Texas dismissed an action to enjoin a Mexican bus company that
operated buses between a city in Mexico and another city in Texas
from violating the FLSA, because its employees performed only a
minor part of their services in the United States and spent the major-
ity of their working time in Mexico. In applying the exemption pro-
vision, the court pointed out that forcing the company to pay the
minimum wages provided by the FLSA could result in such problems
as fare increases and, ultimately, the discontinuance of the bus
service. 1 16
These two decisions may seem inconsistent. While the Wirtz
court rejected the application of the exemption provision to employ-
ees who worked outside U.S. territory for a part of their workweek,
the employees in Hodgson who drove buses within U.S. territory were
held to come within the exemption provision. But, the interpreta-
tion of the term "workplace" helps to distinguish these cases. In
Wirtz, although the tour escort visited foreign countries on business,
his workplace or employment base remained in the United States.
Thus, applying the FLSA would not distort the local economy of the
foreign country. However, the employees in Hodgson who drove
buses within U.S. territory were still part of the operation of their
Mexican workplace, even when they were outside Mexican territory.
Forcing the employer in this situation to pay minimum wages under
the FLSA could distort the operation of its business as well as the
local economy in Mexico.
Relying on these cases, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) issued a policy statement that the Equal Pay
Act, although without extraterritorial reach, may cover workers
whose "work station" or "employment base" is within the United
States." t 7 This view will be analyzed in detail in Part IV of this
Article.
114 Id.
115 331 F. Supp. 1119 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
116 Id. at 1122. Following Wirtz and Hodgson, the Department of Labor took the posi-
tion that the travel time spent abroad during a part of workweek is compensable under the
FLSA when the employee works within U.S. territory for the rest of the workweek, while
the travel time spent abroad for the whole workweek is not compensable. Foreign Travel,
Opinion WH-510 (by Deputy Wage Hour Administrator Henry T. White, June 29, 1981),
6A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) Wage Hour Manual 93:211.
1 17 EEOC Policy Guidance: Application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (ADEA) and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA) to American Firms Overseas, Their
Overseas Subsidiaries, and Foreign Firms, No. N-915.039, EEOC Compliance Manual
(BNA) N: 3915 (1989).
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B. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
1. Before 1984 Amendment
a. Issue of Extraterritoriality
A number of lower courts agree that the ADEA, prior to its
amendment in 1984, had no extraterritorial effect."18 These courts
rely principally on section 7(b) of the ADEA, which provides that
provisions of the ADEA "shall be enforced in accordance with the
powers, remedies, and procedures provided in section... 216... of
[the Fair Labor Standards Act] (except for subsection (a)
thereof)."" 9  According to subsection (d) of section 216 of the
FLSA, "no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment
on account of his failure to comply with any provision of such Act (1)
with respect to work ... performed in a workplace to which the ex-
emption in section 213(f) . . . is applicable."' 120 Section 213(") in
turn provides that the FLSA "shall not apply with respect to any em-
ployee whose services during the workweek are performed in a work-
place within a foreign country .... ,,12' Thus section 7(b) of the
ADEA, by incorporating section 213(f) of the FLSA, excludes foreign
workplaces from its coverage.
Relying on this statutory language, the lower court decisions re-
jected the argument that substantive provisions of the ADEA are
modeled after Title VII,' 2 2 which was held to have extraterritorial
coverage when these decisions were rendered.' 2 3 According to
these decisions, Title VII is distinguishable from the ADEA. Title
VII contains a provision exempting employers with respect to the
employment of aliens outside the United States, which, as discussed
below,' 24 may bring about a negative inference that it applies to
American citizens employed abroad.125
118 Lopez v. Pan Am World Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 1118, 1120 (11th Cir. 1987);
DeYoreo v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 785 F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th Cir. 1986); Ralis v.
RFE/RL Inc., 770 F.2d 1121, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Thomas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 745
F.2d 279, 281 (4th Cir. 1984); Wolf v. J. I. Case Co., 617 F. Supp. 858, 861 (E.D. Wis.
1985); Belanger v. Keydril Co., 596 F. Supp. 823, 825 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd, 772 F.2d 902
(5th Cir. 1985); Pfeiffer v. WM. Wrigley Jr. Co., 573 F. Supp. 458, 460 (N.D. II1. 1983),
aff'd, 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985); Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 567 F. Supp. 1453,
1456 (D. Col. 1983), aff'd, 750 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984); Cleary v. United States Lines,
Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251, 1263 (D.N.J. 1983), aff'd, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
119 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
120 Id. § 216(d).
121 Id. § 218(f.
122 See supra note 118. But see Kathleen A. O'Brien, Note, Cleary v. United States Lines,
Inc.: The Protections of the ADEA Not to Apply to American Citizens Employed Abroad, 9 N.C. J.
Il'"L L. & CoM. REG. 173, 183 (1983) ("the court in Cleary placed undue reliance on the
technical similarities between the ADEA and FLSA").
123 See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
124 See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
125 E.g., Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251, 1261 (D.NJ. 1983).
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b. Foreign "Workplace"
In )eiffer v. WM. Wrigley Jr. Co. ,126 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit suggested that the ADEA would apply to employees
working abroad when they continue to belong to their work station
in the United States. 12 7 The opinion by Judge Posner set forth a
hypothetical case in which an employer sent its employee abroad
temporarily to get around the ADEA and then fired that employee
while abroad. He stated that in this situation the employer cannot
avoid liability under the ADEA.128 The statutory ground for this po-
sition may be that the services of the employee here are not those
which are "performed in a workplace within a foreign country"
under section 213(f) of the FLSA, as incorporated into the ADEA.
This theory is in line with Wirtz v. Healy,129 which held that the ex-
emption provision under section 213(f) did not apply where an em-
ployee of a U.S. travel agency spent part of the workweek in foreign
countries escorting tours.' 30 Thus, these cases suggest a flexible in-
terpretation of the foreign "workplace" exemption, so that the
ADEA applies to business travelers whose work stations are located
in the United States. 13 1
Another issue regarding the foreign "workplace" arises when an
employee working abroad attacks an employment decision that was
made in the United States. In such a case the employee may argue
that even if the ADEA does not cover foreign soils it would apply to
decisions made within U.S. territory. A few lower court decisions
have addressed this issue and have held that the place of decision is
irrelevant. In Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc. ,132 for example, the em-
ployee insisted that the decision to discharge him was made in the
United States, not in London where he had performed his job, and
that the employer's liability does not depend on the extraterritorial
application of the ADEA. The court rejected this argument, stating
that "[t]he language of section 213(f) . . .looks to the place of em-
ployment, not the place where the decision was made."' 133 Zahourek
v. Arthur Young & Co. 134 also rejected the place of decision test. In
addition to the language of the FLSA, the court relied on the propo-
sition that the discriminatory effect of dismissal was in the em-
ployee's place of employment, Honduras, where the ADEA did not
126 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985).
127 Id. at 559.
128 Id.
129 227 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
13o id. at 129.
131 See infra notes 258-78 and accompanying text.
132 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
133 Id. at 610 n.6. See also Wolf v. J. I. Case Co., 617 F. Supp. 858, 860 (E.D. Wis.
1985); Belanger v. Keydril Co., 596 F. Supp. 823, 824 (E.D. La. 1984).
134 567 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Colo. 1983), aft'd, 750 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984).
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However, if the effect of the employment decision were to be a
determinative factor as to the applicability of the ADEA, it could not
apply even when the employer sends its employee abroad temporar-
ily and fires that employee to avoid its liability under the ADEA,
since the effect of such discharge would be on foreign soil. This is
contrary to Judge Posner's opinion in Pfeifer.i3 6 Moreover, for cer-
tain decisions such as discharge of an employee, the place of decision
seems to have the most significant connection with the regulation
under the ADEA.' 3 7 Thus, it is necessary to put some limitation on
the concept of "workplace."
In Lopez v. Pan Am World Services, Inc., 138 the court extended the
foreign "workplace" exemption to a situation where a U.S. citizen
residing in the United States was denied an application to a U.S. cor-
poration for employment in Venezuela. The court, after rejecting
the argument that the ADEA should have extraterritorial reach, held
that the workplace for the applicant's job would have been Vene-
zuela and not the United States, where the decision was made.' 3 9
However, if the place of decision test is to be adopted, the court
should apply the ADEA. In addition, when no actual employment
has ever taken place, there is no reason to exempt the employer from
regulation under the ADEA. This is because conflict with local regu-
lations, which was the consideration that led Congress to add the
foreign workplace exemption to the FLSA (and the ADEA), will not
occur in this situation. 140 Indeed, Title VII has been applied to simi-
lar cases without reference to its extraterritoriality. In Kern v.
Dynalectron Corp., 14 1 the plaintiff was employed by the defendant to
work as a helicopter pilot in Saudi Arabia. The plaintiff was dis-
charged because he refused to convert to the Moslem religion. Saudi
Arabian law prohibits, under penalty of death, the entry of non-Mos-
lems into Mecca, where the plaintiff's job required him to fly.
Although his place of employment, according to the Lopez case,
would have been Saudi Arabia, the court applied Title VII1 4 2 without
addressing the issue of extraterritoriality.' 4 3
135 Id. at 1457.
136 See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. In addition, in certain cases where a
decision to discharge is made in the United States, it may cause some chilling effect on
elder workers as to their employment opportunities abroad. See infra notes 215-18 and
accompanying text.
137 See infra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
138 813 F.2d 1118 (11th Cir. 1987).
139 Id. at 1120.
140 Id. at 1121 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
141 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984).
142 Id. at 1198. The court held that the requirement of conversion to the Moslem
religion in this case was a bona fide occupational qualification. Id. at 1202.
143 The court in Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine also held that a U.S. hospital's
refusal to send its Jewish anesthesiologists to Saudi Arabia for cardiovascular services be-
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These decisions on the "foreign workplace" exemption have
raised the issue of the scope of territorial application, which will be
discussed in Part IV of this Article.
2. 1984 Amendment
In 1984, Congress amended the ADEA to extend its coverage to
U.S. citizens employed by a U.S. employer in foreign countries. As
amended, section 1 (f) of the ADEA provides that "the term 'em-
ployee' includes any individual who is a citizen of the United States
employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign country."' 144
Moreover, this amendment made the ADEA applicable to foreign
corporations controlled by U.S. employers, borrowing a four-factor
test from the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) case law which
was used to treat separate business entities as a single employer.' 45
Section 4(h) provides that:
(1) If an employer controls a corporation whose place of incorpora-
tion is in a foreign country, any practice by such corporation prohib-
ited under this section shall be presumed to be such practice by such
employer.
(2) The prohibitions of this section shall not apply where the em-
ployer is a foreign person not controlled by an American employer.
(3) For the purpose of this subsection the determination of whether
an employer controls a corporation shall be based upon the:
(A) interrelation of operations,
(B) common management,
(C) centralized control of labor relations, and
(D) common ownership or financial control, of the employer
and the corporation. 146
According to its legislative history, the purpose of this amend-
ment is to "insure that citizens of the United States who are em-
ployed in a foreign workplace by .U.S. corporations or their
subsidiaries enjoy the protections of the [ADEA]."' 147 This amend-
ment does not apply to foreign employees or to foreign corporations
which are not controlled by American employers. This is due to the
"well-established principles of sovereignty... that no nation has the
right to impose its labor standards on another country."' 148 This
cause of their religion violated Title VII, without referring to the issue of extraterritorial-
ity. 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986).
144 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988). For the issues arising under the amendment, see Louis
P. Zanar, Note, Recent Amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 19 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 165 (1985).
145 See Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast Serv.
of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965).
146 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(3) (1988).
147 S. REP. No. 98- 467, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3000.
148 Id. For criticism of this amendment, see James Michael Zimmerman, Extraterritorial
Application of Federal Labor Laws: Congress's Flawed Extension of ADEA, 21 CORNELL INT'L LJ.
103 (1988) (criticizing the amendment on the basis that it would cause international polit-
ical problems).
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consideration was also a factor in the amendment to section 4(0 of
the ADEA, which allows an employer a foreign compulsion de-
fense.' 49 This section provides that:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency or la-
bor organization -
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited.., where such practices
involve an employee in a workplace in a foreign country, and com-
pliance with such subsections would cause such employer, or a cor-
poration controlled by such employer, to violate the laws of the
country in which such workplace is located.1 50
A recent case has presented the question of whether a German
court order upholding a labor-management agreement which re-
quires mandatory retirement at age 65 may be a defense under sec-
tion 4(f).15 1 Although the court has not yet rendered judgment, the
EEOC asserts that such a court order is not a German law and there-
fore should not be relied on as a defense. 152 This position is consis-
tent with lower court decisions as to foreign compulsion in other
areas. In the context of antitrust law, for example, Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America, N. T. & S.A. 15 3 held that "mere governmental
approval or foreign governmental involvement which the defendant
had arranged does not necessarily provide a defense." 154
C. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
1. Lower Courts in Conflict
Lower courts were in sharp conflict over the extraterritoriality of
Title VII. Several U.S. district courts agreed that Title VII applies to
American citizens employed by U.S. employers in foreign coun-
tries.' 5 5 These courts mainly relied on a so-called "alien exemption"
provision, which provides that Title VII "shall not apply to an em-
ployer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any
State,"' 5 6 drawing a negative inference that U.S. citizens employed
149 See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
150 29 U.S.C. § 623(f(1) (1988).
'5' EEOC v. Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, C.A. No. 89-0153 (filed Jan. 23,
1989) cited in Joy Cherian, Current Development in Transnational Employment Rights, 40 LaB. L.J.
259, 261 (1989).
152 Id. Contra, Chris Lauderdale, Recent Developments, Age Discrimination-Extraterritorial
Application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act--Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Determines That a United States Corporation in West Germany Is Subject to Suit Under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act-Employer's Defense Based on Compliance with West German Law Re-
jected, 20 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 207, 219 (1990) [hereinafter Recent Developments, Age
Discrimination]. On May 4, 1990, the EEOC filed a motion for dismissal without prejudice
in Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, C.A., 1990 WL 154321 (D.D.C.).
15S 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
'54 Id. at 606.
155 Bryant v. International Sch. Serv., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.NJ. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982); Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp.
590 (D. Md. 1986); Love v. Pullman, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423,426 n.4 (D. Colo.
1976), aff'd on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1978).
156 40 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1988).
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abroad are covered by Title VII.' 5 7 However, in Boureslan v.
ARAMCO,' 58 the panel majority of the Fifth Circuit held that Title
VII has no extraterritorial reach. On rehearing en banc, the majority
opinion affirmed this conclusion, with five judges dissenting. 159 Fol-
lowing this decision, one district court also denied extraterritorial
coverage of Title VII, t' ° while another district court refused to fol-
low the Fifth Circuit. 16 1 Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the ARAMCO case. 162
2. Supreme Court in EEOC v. ARAMCO
The plaintiff in ARAMCO is a U.S. citizen who was born in Leba-
non. After being hired as an engineer by one of the subsidiaries of
the defendant, ARAMCO, he was transferred, at his own request, to
Saudi Arabia to work for the defendant. Although the defendant is a
Delaware corporation, its principal place of business is in Saudi Ara-
bia. About four years later, the plaintiff was discharged allegedly be-
cause of his race, religion, and national origin. Affirming the
decision of the Fifth Circuit, the majority of the Supreme Court in
EEOC v. ARAMCO denied the extraterritorial application of Title
VII.
a. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ac-
knowledges that "Congress has the authority to enforce its laws be-
yond the territorial boundaries of the United States."' 63 However,
the opinion stresses the presumption against extraterritoriality, stat-
ing that "[i]t is a long-standing principle of American law 'that legis-
lation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.' "64 The basis for this presumption is, according to the ma-
jority, the concern over "unintended clashes between our laws and
those of other nations which could result in international dis-
cord."' 65 The majority opinion, citing Benz v. Compania Naviera Hi-
dalgo, S.A., 166 requires "the affirmative intention of the Congress
'57 E.g., Bryant, 502 F. Supp. at 482.
158 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988), aft'g, 653 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
159 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
160 EEOC v. Kloster Cruise Ltd., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1229, 1231 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (rejecting the issuance of a subpoena as to alleged discrimination on a foreign flag
vessel).
161 Akgun v. Boeing Co., 53 Empi. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,011 (W.D. Wa. 1990).162 111 S.Ct. 40 (1990).
163 EEOC v. ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991).
164 Id. (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
165 Id.
166 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) (rejecting the extraterritorial application of the Labor
Management Relations Act).
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clearly expressed" to rebut this presumption. 167
The dissenting opinion by Justice Marshall, joined by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens, describes the majority opinion as improperly
invoking a "clear statement rule."'168 Justice Marshall insists that the
presumption against extraterritoriality is not a rule which requires a
clear statement for extraterritoriality. 169 Rather, he states, "a court
may properly rely on this presumption only after exhausting all of
the traditional tools 'whereby unexpressed congressional intent may
be ascertained.' "170 On the other hand, Justice Marshall continues,
the clear statement rule would "foreclose inquiry into extrinsic guide
to interpretation.... and even compel courts to select less plausible
candidates from within the range of permissible constructions."' 71
According to the dissenting opinion, the majority "overstates the
strength of presumption by drawing on language from cases involv-
ing a wholly independent rule of construction: 'that an act of Con-
gress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains.' 1172 This is a statement of the
Charming Betsy principle. ' 7 3
b. Rebuttal of Presumption Rejected
(1) "Employer" and "Commerce"
The majority holds that there is no "sufficient affirmative evi-
dence" to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality of Title
VII. 174 First, the majority rejects the argument of the EEOC and
Boureslan that the provisions defining "employer" and "commerce"
indicate a congressional intent for extraterritoriality. Title VII ap-
plies to an employer who has fifteen or more employees for a specific
period and is "engaged in an industry affecting commerce. ' ' 75
"Commerce" means "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, trans-
mission, or communication among the several States; or between a
State and any place outside thereof; or within the District of Colum-
bia, or a possession of the United States; or between points in the
same State but through a point outside thereof."' 76 According to
the EEOC and Boureslan, this broad language evinces congressional
intent to apply Title VII abroad since an employer who affects trade
"between a State and any place outside thereof"' 77 is covered by
167 ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. at 1230.
168 Id. at 1237 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
169 Id.
170 Id. (citing Foley Bros. Inc., v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
171 Id. at 1238.
172 Id. at 1239.
173 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
174 ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. at 1236.
175 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h).
176 Id. § 2000e(g).
177 The EEOC and Boureslan argue that "any place outside thereof" refers to areas
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these provisions. The majority responds that these provisions are
"ambiguous and [do] not speak directly to the question,"' 78 and re-
fers to statutes which contain similarly broad language but have
never been held to apply abroad.' 79 The majority also points out
that case law under the Federal Employers Liability Act' 80 and the
NLRA18 denied these statutes' applicability in spite of their broad
jurisdictional language.18 2
(2) Alien Exemption Provision
The next provision that the EEOC and Boureslan rely on is the
"alien exemption" provision, under which an employer is exempted
from Title VII "with respect to the employment of aliens outside any
State."' 8 3 They assert that this provision provides a negative infer-
ence that U.S. citizens employed outside the United States are cov-
ered by Title VII. To counter this, ARAMCO offered two alternative
interpretations. First, ARAMCO contended that the purpose of this
provision is to exempt aliens employed in the possessions of the
United States outside its territory. Second, ARAMCO contended
that the provision confirms that aliens in the United States are cov-
ered by Title VII. Choosing neither of these alternatives, the major-
ity opinion rejects the "negative inference" argument of EEOC and
Boureslan. Since this provision does not distinguish between for-
eign employers and U.S. employers, the majority states, the extrater-
ritorial application of Title VII would inevitably cover foreign
employers,18 4 and this would lead to "difficult issues of international
law" by imposing U.S. discrimination laws on employment relations
abroad. ' 85
beyond the territory of the United States. It must be noted that the "state" includes Outer
Continental Shelf Lands as defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, as well as
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, and the Canal
Zone. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(i) (1988).
178 ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. at 1231.
179 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (a)(12) (1988); Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(b); Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 402(a); Transportation Safety Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1802(1).
180 See New York Central R.R. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29 (1925).
181 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10
(1963).
182 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), which the petitioners relied on,
was distinguished in that the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, which was held to apply to conduct
abroad in that case, contains more specific language for the congressional intent of extra-
territoriality. ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. at 1232-33. Under the Lanham Act, "commerce" is
defined as "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (1988).
183 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1988).
184 See Lairold M. Street, Application of U.S. Fair Employment Laws to Transnational Employ-
ers in the U.S. and Abroad, 19 N.Y.U.J. Irr'L L. & POL. 357, 369 (1987) (affirming the appli-
cability of Title VII to foreign employers).
185 ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. at 1234.
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The dissenters accept the petitioners' "negative inference" ar-
gument.' 8 6 ARAMCO's alternative argument, that the alien exemp-
tion provision is meant to exempt aliens in the possessions of the
United States, was rejected because foreign soils and such posses-
sions are subject to the same jurisdictional rule of construction. 8 7
In other words, if such possessions are covered by Title VII, foreign
soils will be equally covered. The argument that the provision
merely confirms that Title VII applies to aliens in the U.S. territory
was also rejected. According to the dissenting opinion, since the
protection of aliens in the United States is predicated on the provi-
sion prohibiting discrimination against "any individual,"' l88 the in-
terpretation suggested by ARAMCO would make the alien
exemption provision superfluous.' 8 9 Moreover, the dissenters rely
on the legislative history of this provision. They refer to a statement
in the House Report' 90 on an earlier Civil Rights bill, 191 which con-
tained the alien exemption provision and was incorporated into the
bill 192 that eventually became the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Accord-
ing to this House Report, the purpose of the alien exemption provi-
sion is "to remove conflicts of law which might otherwise exist between
the United States and a foreign nation in the employment of aliens
outside the United States by an American enterprise."'193 The dis-
senters argue that this provision is meant to insulate Title VII from
the possible problems that might result from its extraterritorial ap-
plication.' 94 On the other hand, the majority does not examine the
legislative history or make any comment on the statement in the
House Report.
(3) Domestic Focus of Title VII
The majority opinion draws attention to some sections of Title
VII which, in their view, display concern only with domestic matters.
The majority first points to the provisions on the avoidance of undue
interference with state laws. 195 For example, one section states that
provisions of Title VII shall not be construed to indicate congres-
sional intent to preempt state employment discrimination laws, 196
186 Id. at 1240-41.
187 Id. at 1242.
188 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1988). The dissenting opinion relies on Espinoza v. Farah
Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973). ARAMCO, Il1 S.Ct. at 1242.
189 ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. at 1242.
190 H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
191 H.R. REP. No. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
192 H.R. REP. No. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
193 H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. at 4 (1963) (emphasis added). See also S.
REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d. Sess. 11 (1964) ("[e]xempted from the bill are ... U.S.
employers employing citizens of foreign countries in foreign lands").
194 EEOC v. ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. 1227, 1241 (1991).
195 Id. at 1234.
196 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1988).
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but no corresponding provision is found which indicates concern
over possible problems with its extraterritorial application. More-
over, the majority continues, Title VII lacks an overseas enforcement
mechanism over venue and the EEOC's investigatory authority or
subpoena power. 197 Justice Marshall's dissent counters that the
alien exemption provision is the very provision that is based on the
concern over conflict with foreign laws. 198 He also suggests that the
"principal office" venue' 99 under Title VII is available for actions
against American employers doing business abroad and that the limi-
tation on the territorial reach of subpoena power does not prevent
EEOC's investigation in other ways. 200
(4) Deference to Administrative Interpretation
The majority rejects the EEOC's argument that the judiciary
should pay deference to its interpretation declaring the extraterrito-
riality of Title VII.2 0 Since the EEOC has no rulemaking authority,
the majority states, its interpretation carries less weight than that of
agencies with rulemaking power, and whether to defer to the agency
depends on the thoroughness of consideration, consistency with its
earlier and later interpretations, and so on.20 2 According to the ma-
jority, since the EEOC's current interpretation is inconsistent with its
earlier position 20 3 and has no statutory support, the Court should
not defer to its interpretation. 20 4 The dissenting opinion20 5 denies
that the EEOC's interpretations are inconsistent, pointing out that
its earlier interpretation was issued in a context irrelevant to extra-
territorial application.20 6
197 ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. at 1234. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(3), 2000e-9 (1988).
198 ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. at 1243.
199 "If the [employer] is not found within any district .... an action [as to the em-
ployer's discrimination] may be brought within the judicial district in which the [employer]
has his principal office." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
200 ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. at 1243-44. Justice Marshall in his dissent points out that
there are some extraterritorial statutes which lack overseas subpoena power. Id. at 1244.
E.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 209, 626(a); 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1988) (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act).
201 See EEOC Policy Guidance: Application of Title VII to American Companies Over-
seas, Their Subsidiaries, and to Foreign Companies, No. N-915.033, EEOC Compliance
Manual (BNA) 605:0055 (1989).
202 ARAMCO, Ill S.Ct. at 1235. Relying on Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),Justice Scalia's concurring opinion states that
lack of rulemaking power does not lead to less deference under current law.
203 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1(c) (1971) ("Title VII ... protects all individuals, both citizens
and noncitizens, domiciled or residing in the United States, against discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin").
204 ARAMCO, Ill S.Ct. at 1235.
205 In addition to the EEOC's interpretation, the dissenting opinion draws attention to
the interpretation of the Department ofJustice to the same effect. Id. at 1245 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
206 Id. at 1246 (stating that the EEOC's earlier interpretation was concerned with na-
tional origin discrimination against non-citizens in the United States and that the extrater-
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3. Analysis of the Court Opinion
a. Strength of Presumption
The principal question involved in determining the geographi-
cal coverage of Title VII is whether Congress intended to apply Title
VII beyond U.S. territory. The contrary conclusions reached by the
majority and the dissent stemmed from their different approaches to
discerning congressional intent under the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality.20 7 Under the "clear statement rule" as described by
the dissent,20 8 the majority focused on whether Title VII contains a
provision expressing an intent for extraterritoriality without explor-
ing, as the dissent did, its legislative history, especially that of the
alien exemption provision. Although it is unclear whether the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality should be, as the dissenters ar-
gued, distinguished from the presumption based on the Charming
Betsy principle, it must be noted that there is a difference in the
strength of the presumption depending on the basis for the pre-
sumption. 20 9 Under the stronger presumption of the Charming Betsy
principle, courts must search for congressional intent for extraterri-
torial application,210 which should be so clear as to preclude any
other "possible" or "fairly possible" constructions that may avoid
violations of international law. Under the weaker presumption, on
the other hand, the inquiry for such alternative interpretations is not
required, and courts may infer congressional intent for extraterrito-
riality by relying on conventional methods of statutory
construction.2 11
ritorial application of Title VII to noncitizens was impossible because of the alien
exemption provision) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
207 According to Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in ARAMCO, the majority's un-
derstanding of the presumption against extraterritoriality supplies the "driving force" of
its analysis. Id. at 1237 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
208 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
209 See supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text. Judge King's dissenting opinion in
the en banc decision in Boureslan v. ARAMCO, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990) (King, J.,
dissenting), aff'd sub nom. EEOC v. Aramco, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (Marshall, J., dissenting), de-
scribes the difference as follows:
[W]e are guided by a presumption that acts of Congress are intended to ap-
ply only within the territory of the United States unless there is a clear ex-
pression of congressional intent to the contrary....
892 F.2d at 1275. The court continues in footnote 1:
There is a second, and distinct, presumption that Congress does not intend
to violate international law. A statute may not be construed to violate inter-
national law unless Congress has, by an "affirmative expression" of its intent,
required such a construction .... The less stringent standard of the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application of a federal statute does not re-
quire an explicit, affirmative statement of Congress. Instead, the Supreme
Court has said that the presumption "is a valid means whereby unexpressed
congressional intent may be ascertained." Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285 (em-
phasis added by the Judge).
892 F.2d at 1275 n.l.
210 See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
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Though the majority expresses concern over "unintended
clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could re-
sult in international discord," 2 12 violation of specific jurisdictional
principles of international law resulting from the extraterritorial ap-
plication of Title VII is not expressly mentioned in the majority opin-
ion.213 Nonetheless, if Title VII covered foreign employers doing
business abroad, its extraterritorial application would have an insuffi-
cient basis in jurisdictional principles of interriational law. If Title
VII applied only to U.S. employers doing business abroad, such ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction could be based on the nationality princi-
ple.2 14 However, its application to overseas discrimination by
foreign employers needs another basis in international law.
It may be argued that the effects doctrine 215 provides this basis.
Judge King's dissenting opinion in the Fifth Circuit panel decision in
ARAMCO suggested2 16 that discrimination abroad would have ad-
verse effects on minorities and women since foreign assignments,
which are often necessary steps on the corporate ladder, could mean
the loss of protection of Title VI1217 and limit their employment op-
portunities in the United States. 218 But, as Judge King concedes,
"[t]he personal injury caused by employment discrimination cannot
readily be characterized in terms of their 'effects.. ' 19 Moreover,
212 ARAMCO, Ill S.Ct. at 1230.
213 Rather, the majority states that "Congress has the authority to enforce its laws
beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States." Id.
214 Janelle M. Diller, Note, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Multinational
Enterprise, 73 GEO. L.J. 1465, 1488 (1985) [hereinafter Title VII and the Multinational Enter-
prise]; William A. Shutkin, Notes, Same Boss, Different Rules: An Argument for Extraterritorial
Extension of Title VII to Protect U.S. Citizens Abroad by U.S. Multinational Corporations, 30 VA. J.
INT'L L. 479,499-500 (1990) [hereinafter Notes, Same Boss, Diferent Rules]. For the nation-
ality principle, see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. It has sometimes been ques-
tioned whether a U.S. corporation and one of its foreign subsidiaries constitute a single
employer so that the subsidiary's conduct may be subject to the extraterritorial regulation
of Title VII. To determine the single employer status, several lower court decisions have
engaged in a four-factor test, which originated from the case law under the NLRA and was
incorporated into the 1984 amendment of the ADEA. E.g., Mas Marques v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 637 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1980). For the content of the four-factor test, see supra
notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
216 This suggestion was made in the context of the reasonableness of the extraterrito-
rial application of Title VII. See infra notes 224-32 and accompanying text.
217 As proposed in Part IV, a foreign assignment may be covered by the territorial
application of Title VII if (1) such an assignment is a business trip abroad or (2) the chal-
lenged decision to discharge and refuse to hire employees was made in the United States.
See infra notes 258-99 and accompanying text.
218 Boureslan v. ARAMCO, 857 F.2d 1014, 1026-27 (5th Cir. 1988). See also W.Joseph
Dehner, Jr., Multinational Enterprise and Racial Non-Discrimination: United States Enforcement of
an International Human Right, 15 HARV. INT'L L. REV. 71, 99 (1974); Notes, Civil Rights In
Employment And The Multinational Corporations, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 87, 96 (1976); Debra
L.W. Cohn, Notes, Equal Employment Opportunity for Americans Abroad, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1288, 1295-96 (1987) [hereinafter Notes, Equal Employment Opportunity Abroad].
219 Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1026. Judge King does not rely heavily on the effects doc-
trine for her conclusion that the extraterritorial application of Title VII is not unreasona-
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although such effects may be found with respect to discrimination by
U.S. employers, it may be difficult to find these effects in U.S. terri-
tory in a case where a foreign employer discriminated against its em-
ployee abroad-the very case that needs reliance on the effects
doctrine.220 Some commentators also argue that the passive person-
ality principle 22 1 may be a basis for the extraterritorial application of
Title VII. 2 22 However, this principle has generally not been ac-
cepted as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction. 223
Judge King's dissenting opinion in the Fifth Circuit panel deci-
sion relied on the reasonableness test under the Restatement
(Third)224 as a means of adjustment between the extraterritorial ap-
plication of domestic laws and interests of foreign countries. Judge
King concluded that the extraterritorial application of Title VII is
not unreasonable in light of the following factors:225 the adverse ef-
fects of discrimination abroad on the employment opportunities of
minorities and women in the United States; 226 the connection be-
tween the United States and persons to be regulated or protected by
Title VII; 2 27 the importance and desirability of having the regulation
promote the generally accepted principle of anti-discrimination;228
the justified expectations of American employees working abroad of
protection from discrimination;229 and the elimination of possible
conflicts with regulations of host countries by the alien exemption
provision. 230 As to the last factor, the bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation 23 ' and foreign compulsion defenses are also available if com-
ble. Rather, she states that such effects are not necessary to apply civil rights legislation
abroad. Id. at 1026-27. See also Kenneth Kirschner, The Extrateritorial Application of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, 34 LAB. LJ. 394, 401 (1983) ("the enforcement of Title VII outside
the United States would have no real domestic impact").
220 In such a case, neither territorial nor nationality principle may afford a basis for
U.S. jurisdiction. See Title VII and the Multinational Enterpise, supra note 214, at 1488.
221 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
222 Civil Rights in Employment and the Multinational Corporations, supra note 218, at 97;
Notes, Equal Employment Opportunity Abroad, supra note 218, at 1294.
223 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
224 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
225 Boureslan v. ARAMCO, 857 F.2d 1014, 1025-31 (5th Cir. 1988). See also Note,
Same Boss, Diferent Rules, supra note 214, at 501-10.
226 See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text. This can be a factor listed in RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) § 403(2)(a).
227 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403(2)(b). When Judge King referred to this factor,
she presupposed that Title VII applies only to U.S. employers. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at
1027.
228 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 403(2)(c), (e), (f).
229 Id. § 403(2)(d).
230 See id. § 403(2)(h).
231 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988) provides:
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees on the basis of his religion, sex or national origin ...
where religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business or
enterprise ...
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pliance with Title VII brings about conflicts with foreign laws.232
Although several circuits in antitrust cases have relied on the
reasonableness test or "jurisdictional rule of reason" test, 23 3 these
courts have found that the activities at issue had their "effects" on
the U.S. domestic economy. 234 Thus, these cases may be distin-
guished in that the courts invoked this test where the U.S. extraterri-
torial jurisdiction could have been based on the effects doctrine,
which the employment discrimination cases may not always
invoke. 23 5
b. Rebuttal of Presumption
If the extraterritorial application of Title VII covers foreign em-
ployers, it does not conform to the principles of jurisdiction in inter-
national law, and the stronger presumption under the Charming Betsy
principle applies. The question is whether there is clear congres-
sional intent for such extraterritorial application that precludes any
other fairly possible interpretation of Title VII, including the alien
exemption provision. The most plausible alternative interpretation
is that Title VII applies extraterritorially only to U.S. employers
abroad. The majority opinion rejected this interpretation without
exploring the legislative history of the alien exemption provision.2 36
However, as discussed in Part 11,237 the strong presumption under
the Charming Betsy principle does not mean that courts need not con-
sider the relevant legislative history. In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional
de Marineros de Honduras,238 where the stronger presumption applied,
the Court searched the legislative history of the NLRA for an expres-
sion of congressional intent to apply the NLRA abroad. Thus, the
legislative history of the alien exemption provision is relevant in de-
termining whether any other fairly possible interpretations which al-
low Title VII to apply only to U.S. employers are foreclosed.
The House Report on the early Civil Rights bill, from which the
alien exemption provision originated, contained a statement that the
provision was meant "to remove conflicts of law which might other-
wise exist between the United States and a foreign nation in the em-
ployment of aliens outside the United States by an American
enterprise."239 This indicates that the alien exemption provision pre-
supposed that the extraterritorial application of Title VII would
232 See infra notes 308-42 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
234 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 549, 610
(9th Cir. 1976); Mannington Mills, Inc., v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d
Cir. 1979).
235 See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
236 See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
237 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
238 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963).
239 H.R. REP. No. 570, supra note 190, at 4 (emphasis added). See also S. REP. No. 867,
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cover only U.S. employers abroad. In light of this legislative history,
the interpretation which limits the extraterritorial coverage of Title
VII to U.S. employers abroad may not be foreclosed. Although the
majority seems to suggest that such a distinction is impossible under
the language of Title VII, 240 the Court made such a distinction in
Steele v. Boluva Watch Co. 241 In Steele, the Court interpreted the Lan-
ham Trade-Mark Act, which on its face does not distinguish U.S. citi-
zens from foreigners,2 42 to apply extraterritorially only to U.S.
citizens.243
Since an interpretation distinguishing U.S. employers from for-
eign employers with respect to the extraterritorial application of Ti-
tle VII is "fairly possible," the next question is whether, under the
weaker presumption against extraterritoriality, there is congressional
intent to apply Title VII to U.S. employers abroad.244 Because this is
the weaker presumption based on congressional concern for domes-
tic matters, it may be rebutted by an inference of congressional in-
tent under traditional techniques of statutory construction, without
inquiry of other "fairly possible" interpretations. 245 In view of the
legislative history indicating that the purpose of the alien exemption
provision is to avoid conflict of laws with foreign countries, the most
natural inference from this provision is that Congress intended to
apply Title VII overseas only with respect to the employment of U.S.
citizens abroad. 246 The interpretation that this provision merely
confirms that Title VII protects aliens within the U.S. territory is less
plausible because the purpose of this provision is to avoid "conflicts
of law . . . in the employment of aliens outside the United States.' 24 7
supra note 193, at 11 (1964) ("(e]xempted from the bill are ... U.S. employers employing
citizens of foreign countries in foreign lands") (emphasis added).
240 EEOC v. ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. 1227, 1234 (1991) ("[wle see no way of distinguish-
ing in its application between the United States employers and foreign employers").
241 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
242 Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act states that "[afny person" who infringes a regis-
tered trademark shall be liable in a civil action. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988) (emphasis added).
243 Steele, 344 U.S. at 284-86. Cf. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633,
642-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956) (rejecting application of the Lanham Act
to foreign nationals abroad). Under Title VII, one district court held that it shall not apply
to foreign employers with respect to employment of U.S. citizens abroad. Lavrov v. NCR
Corp., 600 F. Supp. 923, 932 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
244 This analysis is necessary because there are other possible interpretations of the
alien exemption provision. Such alternatives are, as ARAMCO contended, that (a) Title
VII applies extraterritorially only to employers in U.S. possessions and (b) the alien ex-
emption provision merely confirms that aliens within the U.S. territory shall be protected
by Title VII. ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. at 1233-34.
245 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 190-93. See also Lucion A. Moolenaar, III, Comment, Boureslan v.
ARAMCO: Equal Employment Opportunity for U.S. Citizens Abroad, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J., 564,
584 (1989).
247 H. R. REP. No. 570, supra note 190, at 4 (emphasis added). Although this provision
brings about a negative inference that aliens within the U.S. territory are protected, Espi-
noza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973), this does not negate the other negative
inference that U.S. citizens working abroad are covered by Title VII.
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The third interpretation, that this provision is meant to exempt em-
ployers with respect to aliens employed in the possessions of the
United States, is also inconsistent with the legislative history because
the statement of the purpose of the provision does not refer to the
"possession." 2 48
IV. Limits of Territorial and Extraterritorial Application of Fair
Employment Laws
The Supreme Court in ARAMCO seems to have resolved one of
the major issues surrounding the geographical coverage of U.S. fair
employment laws. However, two important issues remain: first,
whether territorial statutes may cover employment abroad that has
certain connections to U.S. territory; and second, whether defenses
that limit the extraterritorial application of fair employment laws are
available when such application conflicts with foreign laws and
customs.
A. Limits of Territorial Application: Applicability of U.S. Territorial
Laws to Employment Abroad
1. Business Trip Abroad
a. Classification of Employment Abroad
Since the Equal Pay Act and, according to the Supreme Court
Title VII, apply only territorially, the distinction between territorial
and extraterritorial application is an important one to make. This
distinction is not necessarily clear, however. For example, the FLSA,
which has an exemption provision for foreign workplaces,249 was
held to apply to the tour escort in Wirtz v. Healy 2 50 who spent a part
of his workweek in Canada escorting tours, while the bus drivers in
Hodgson v. Union de Permisionarios Circulo,251 whose base of employ-
ment was in Mexico, were held to be exempted by the FLSA even
when they were driving in U.S. territory. In view of the occupations
of the employees in these cases, a tour escort and bus driver, it is
helpful to analyze the common types of employment abroad.
Employment abroad takes place in various forms. One com-
mentator classified U.S. citizens working abroad into three catego-
ries:2 52 (1) resident U.S. employees traveling abroad, (2) expatriates
on assignments abroad, 253 and (3) U.S. citizens living abroad. The
248 Rather, as the dissenters argue, S. REP. No. 867, supra note' 193, at 11, refers to
"foreign lands" in general. ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. at 1242 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
249 29 U.S.C. § 213(t) (1988).
250 227 F. Supp. 123, 129 (N.D. I1. 1964).
251 331 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
252 Janice R. Bellace, The International Dimension of Title VII, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 14-
18 (1991).
253 "Expatriates" are defined as Americans who "work in the U.S. for the corporation
and then are sent abroad for a period of time to work at one of the corporation's subsidiar-
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nexus between a U.S. employer and its employee abroad varies ac-
cording to the category of employment. 254 In analyzing the cover-
age of extraterritorial statutes it is helpful to consider these
variations.
When an employee of a U.S. corporation goes on a business trip
abroad from the corporation's domestic base, the nexus between the
corporation and the employee is very strong. The control of the U.S.
corporation over the employee is most likely to remain unchanged.
Moreover, the employee's duty abroad may be just an extension of
the business activities of the corporation within the United States.
Therefore, in such cases, the employee may well be considered to be
working at the U.S. workplace. In other words, the employee's ordi-
nary workplace is extended abroad. On the other. hand, expatriates
are likely to be more independent from the operation and control of
their employers or parent corporations in the United States. Even
though they are to return to the United States when their assignment
is over, they often are closely connected to local workplaces while on
assignment. Although it is sometimes difficult to do so, the expatri-
ate and the business traveller may be distinguished from one another
according to such factors as continuing control from the employer in
the United States and the relation between the employee's job and
the employer's operation in the United States.255 Finally, the nexus
between U.S. citizens residing and working abroad and their work-
places in the United States is much more tenuous.25 6 These citizens
are not usually in a position to transfer to the United States, are em-
bedded in their local workplaces, and are treated like local
employees. 25 7
ies." Id. at 15. They are normally expected to return to the United States after finishing
their overseas assignments. Id.
254 Id. at 14-18. Based on this classification, Professor Bellace concludes that Title VII
should apply when "an American company is operating what is essentially an 'American
workplace' in a foreign country." Id. at 18. Although the concept of the "extended U.S.
workplace" described below has much in common with Professor Bellace's notion of the
"American workplace" in foreign countries, this Article does not necessarily agree with
her apparent understanding that an application of Title VII in such a manner is to recog-
nize its extraterritorial reach.
255 Professor Bellace lists several factors to determine whether the employee works at
an "American workplace," including the proportion of employees in terms of citizenship
in the employee's job, the duration of employment abroad, and the language which em-
ployees in the job class use at the foreign workplace. Id. Although this Article stresses the
continuing control of the employer in the United States over the employee abroad and the
close relationship of the employee's job to the employer's business activities, the factors
that Professor Bellace lists may be relevant under the proposed standard to determine
whether the employee is under the continuing control of the employer in the United
States.
256 M.
257 The classification discussed above concerns U.S. citizens working abroad for U.S.
corporations. But there remains the issue of the regulation of local labor and employment
relations: the relations between foreign citizens and foreign corporations. Although the
direct U.S. regulation of such local relations are unlikely, the Omnibus Trade and Compet-
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b. Applicability of Territorial Statutes
Among these three categories, employees on business trips
abroad should be covered by U.S. fair employment laws, even if
these laws have only territorial reach, as long as they are working at
the extended U.S. workplaces. 258 In contrast to other types of em-
ployees working abroad, such employees may well be deemed to be
working at the extended U.S. workplaces, and the application of U.S.
laws to them should not be treated as extraterritorial application. In-
deed, there is no reason to treat employees on business trips abroad
differently from other employees working within U.S. territory. For
example, sexual harassment of a female employee by a male col-
league travelling with her should be subject to Title VII, wherever
the sexual harassment may occur.259
Cases decided under the FLSA illustrate this point. In Wirtz,
where the FLSA was applied to a tour escort working for part of the
workweek abroad, 260 the tour escort was in a position equivalent to a
business trip abroad and was still working at his U.S. workplace in an
extended sense.26 1 On the other hand, the employees in Hodgson
who were driving buses between their Mexican base and the U.S.
station belonged to the extended Mexican workplace, even when
they were within U.S. territory. 262 Thus, they were subject to the
exemption provision under the FLSA. Furthermore, Judge Posner's
dicta in feffer v. WM. Wrigley Jr. Co. 263 indicates that an employer in
the United States may not escape liability under the ADEA when it
sends its employee abroad temporarily and discharges him/her be-
itiveness Act authorizes the U.S. government to impose trade sanctions on countries that
do not have fundamental labor legislations. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411 (b), (d)(3)(B)(iii) (1988).
See generally, Theresa A. Amato, Note, Labor Rights Conditionality: United States Trade Legisla-
tion and the International Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79 (1990).
258 This may not be the case with all U.S. statutes regulating employment relations.
For example, most of the regulations over occupational safety and the health of workers
should not be enforced as to those who are on business trips abroad, since these regula-
tions are conditioned on their physical presence at the workplaces in U.S. territory. In
addition, it must be noted that there may be special regulations with respect to business
travellers due to their special status. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.33-.41 (1990) (regulations
for computing working time when employees are traveling in the United States). But such
provisions should apply regardless of whether the employee travels within U.S. territory or
not.
259 Bellace, supra note 252, at 15.
260 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
261 In Wirtz, a tour escort who spent the whole workweek abroad was held to be be-
yond the coverage of the FLSA. The Department of Labor has adopted this position. See
supra note 116 and accompanying text. Under the proposed extended U.S. workplace the-
ory, however, there seems to be no reason to refuse the application of the FLSA, so long as
his workplace was within U.S. territory.
262 See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. See also Wolfv.J. I. Case Co., 617 F.
Supp. 858, 863 (D. Wis. 1985), which refused to apply the ADEA prior to its 1984 amend-
ment to an employee who was ordinarily working in France but made a number of business
trips to the United States.
263 755 F.2d 554, 559 (7th Cir. 1985).
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cause of age. Although he seems to assume that intent to "get
around" the ADEA is required, he reasons that in such a case the
employee's "work station" would be in the United States. 264 Since
the notion of the "work station" is similar to that of the "extended
U.S. workplace,"Judge Posner's theory may well have broader appli-
cability. In contrast to these cases, the plaintiff in ARAMCO was not
on a business trip to Saudi Arabia. After being hired by one of its
subsidiaries, he was transferred to work for ARAMCO in Saudi Ara-
bia, where he worked for nearly four years until he was dis-
charged.265 The holding of the Supreme Court in this case clearly
does not cover business travellers abroad.
Moreover, refusal to apply U.S. fair employment laws to employ-
ees on business trips abroad may cause a vacuum of protection. For
example, most employees visiting Japan on business trips from other
countries will probably not be protected by the Japanese Labour
Standards Law (the "Law"), which, among other things, prohibits
employers from discriminating against their employees because of
their nationality, creed, social status, or-with respect to wages-
sex.266 The applicability of the Law turns on whether the employee
is "employed" at the "jigyo" (enterprise) located in Japan.26 7 The
"jigyo" is interpreted by the Ministry of Labour of Japan as "a body
of business operation which is carried out continuously as an interre-
lated organization at a specific place."'268 Thus, the Law does not
apply to the U.S. workplace of the employees on business trips to
Japan. Moreover, the activities of such employees do not in them-
selves constitute the "jigyo," since such activities are not "a body of
264 d. The "work station" may mean a U.S. workplace as a base of business activities
abroad. Under this notion, a business trip abroad will be covered by U.S. laws so long as
the employee has his/her employment base in the United States. Although the contour of
the "base" is not clear, the application of this notion may lead to similar coverage as to
those under the "extended workplace" test that this article suggests.
265 EEOC v. ARAMCO, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991).
266 Articles three and four of Rodo Kijun Ho (Labour Standards Law)(Law No. 49,
1947) 60, in LABOUR LAWS OF JAPAN 1990 (Ministry of Labour ofJapan & the Japan Insti-
tute of Labour eds.). Sex discrimination in general is covered by articles seven through
eleven of Koyo no Bunya ni Okeru Danjo no Kinto na Kikai oyobi Taigu no Kakuho to
Joshi Rodo Sha no Hukushi no Zoshin ni Kansuru Horitsu (Law Respecting the Improve-
ment of the Welfare of Woman Workers, including the Guarantee of Equal Opportunity
and Treatment between Men and Women in Employment (Law No. 113, 1972) (so-called
Equal Employment Opportunity Law)), in id. at 192. Since this Law regulates conduct of
"employers" and protects their "employees," it may not protect business travellers from
foreign countries who are not under the direction of their employers in Japan. See infra
notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
267 Article 8 of the Labour Standards Law provides, inter alia, that "[t]his law applies to
the enterprises and places of business listed in each item below." LABOUR LAws OFJAPAN
1990, supra note 266, at 38. Although it is not completely clear from the language of this
Law, it is taken for granted that the "enterprise and place of business" are those located in
Japan.
268 Circular (Kihatsu) No. 17, Sept. 13, 1947, in Rono KUUN Ho KAISHAKU SORAN
(Comprehensive Handbook of Interpretations of the Labour Standards Law) 55 (Ministry
of Labour ed. 1989).
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business operation" nor "carried out continuously ... at a specific
place." Even if employees carry out their jobs at a workplace in Ja-
pan that constitutes a "jigyo," which includes branches or subsidiar-
ies of foreign corporations,2 69 the Law protects them only when they
are "employed" by the "jigyo."2 70 To be "employed," they must be
at least under the direction of the "jigyo."271 Therefore, the Law
does not apply to business travellers from foreign countries unless
they work under such direction.
Interestingly, Great Britain has statutorily adopted a similar pol-
icy. Under the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act of 1978,
most of the provisions for employment protection do not generally
apply to the employee who "ordinarily works" outside Great Brit-
ain.2 72 Furthermore, under international law, a temporary visitor to
a foreign country may be outside the coverage of certain local regu-
269 See Circular (Kishu) No. 194 , Oct. 9, 1968, in RODo KIJUM Ho KAISHAKU SORAN,
supra note 268, at 60, which states that "[tihe [Labor Standards] Law shall apply to the
enterprises which are operated in Japan and fall onto one of the items of Article 8 of the
Law, regardless of the nationality of the employer ... and the worker, unless special ex-
ception provisions under other statutes and treaties apply." Thus branches and subsidiar-
ies of foreign corporations are covered by the Law, so long as they constitute the
"business" or "enterprise." See id. As for the meaning of the "business" or "enterprise,"
see supra note 268 and accompanying text.
270 Article 9 of the Labour Standards Law provides that the "worker," whom this Law
protects, shall mean "one who is employed at an enterprise or place of business .. .and
receives wages therefrom, without regard to the kind of occupation." LABOUR LAWS OF
JAPAN 1990, supra note 266, at 62.
271 When an employee who ordinarily works in the United States but is currently on a
business trip to Japan is working at one of the Japanese branches or subsidiaries of his/her
employer in the United States, it is more likely that the employee is under the direction of
that branch or subsidiary. But there may be cases where such an employee is working
independently from such direction.
272 The Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, § 141 (Eng.) provides in
pertinent part;
(1) Sections 1 to 4 [requirement for written particulars of terms of employ-
ment] and 49 to 51 [minimum period of notice for termination] do not apply
in relation to employment during any period when the employee is engaged
in work wholly or mainly outside Great Britain unless the employee ordinary
works in Great Britain and the work outside Great Britain is for the same
employer.
(2) Section 8 [right to itemized pay statement] and 53 [written statement of
reasons for dismissal] and Parts II [guarantee payments, remuneration on
medical suspension, trade union membership and activities, time off work],
III [maternity protection] and V [right against unfair dismissal] do not apply
to employment where under his contract of employment the employee ordi-
narily works outside Great Britain.
(2A) Part VII [employee's right on employer's insolvency] does not ap-
ply to employment where under his contract of employment the employee
ordinarily works outside the territory of the Member States of the European
Communities.
(3) An employee shall not be entitled to a redundancy payment if on the
relevant date he is outside Great Britain, unless under his contract of em-
ployment the employee ordinarily worked in Great Britain.
(4) An employee who under his contract of employment ordinarily works
outside Great Britain shall not be entitled to a redundancy payment unless
on the relevant date he is in Great Britain in accordance with instructions
given to him by his employer.
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lations. According to Professor Mann, a British authority on interna-
tional law, it would be "unreasonable to allow the local sovereign to
regulate the temporary visitor's conduct abroad," 273 because "his
conduct outside the territory in which he merely sojourns is of no
concern to the local sovereign."' 274
Conversely, a current trend in the laws of foreign countries is
that employees on business trips abroad are subject to the law that
applied to them when they were at the workplace in their home
countries. 275 For example, the Ministry of Labour ofJapan has taken
the position that the Labour Standards Law, which contains no extra-
territoriality provision, shall apply2 76 to employees of corporations
in Japan who are dispatched to foreign countries if their work abroad
is deemed to be merely a part of the operations of the "jigyo" in
Japan and not an independent "jigyo" on foreign soil.2 77 Likewise,
under the provisions of the British Employment Protection (Consoli-
dation) Act of 1978, which exempts employees who "ordinarily
work" outside Great Britain, employees travelling abroad will be
covered since they are not "ordinarily working" outside Great
Britain. 278
2. Place of Decision Test
In addition to the analysis of the types of employment abroad, it
273 F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of International jurisdiction Revisited After Twenty Years, 186
R.C.A.D.I. 19, 22 (1984).
274 d. Professor Mann admits that some local laws, such as criminal laws, should ap-
ply even to temporary visitors. Id. But labor and employment laws are, except such mat-
ters as occupational safety and health, not so strongly connected to the physical presence
of workers in the territory as in the case of criminal law. See supra note 258.
275 See FELICE MORGENSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS OF LABOUR LAw 27 (1984).
276 The Law provides criminal sanctions as well as civil remedies against the employer
who violated it. The Ministry of Labour states that the criminal sanctions under this Law
may not generally be enforced even when the Law applies to overseas employment, relying
on the territorial principle underJapanese criminal law. Circular (Kihatsu) No. 776, Aug.
24, 1950, in RODo KIJUN Ho KAISHAKU SORAN, supra note 268, at 61. On the other hand,
the Ministry admits that the employer shall be subject to those sanctions if the violation is
carried out within Japanese territory with regard to the employees working abroad. Id.
But the notion that "the violation is carried out within Japanese territory" needs further
analysis.
277 Id. See also THE MINISTRY OF LABOUR, ZENTM KAISHAKU TsuRAN ROO KIJUN Ho
(Labour Standards Law: Completely Revised Version) 19 (1989); Tadashi Hanami, Kaigai
Kinmu Rodo Mondai noJittai to Hori (Legal Theory and Practice of Labor Relations concern-
ing Overseas Assignment), in KAIGAi KINMU No JrrrAi To HORI (Legal Theory and Prac-
tice of Overseas Assignment) 14 (Tadashi Hanami ed., 1987). Professor Hanami states
that a business trip abroad, whether long or short, is covered by the Labour Standards Law
as well as training and studying in foreign countries, while an assignment to foreign
branches and subsidiaries is not. Id.
278 See Wilson v. Maynard Shipbuilding Consultants, A. B., 1978 Q. B. 665, 677 (Eng.
C.A.) (an employee "ordinarily works" in Great Britain when he is required to go on a
business trip abroad to carry out his contractual duties); See also M. Forde, Transnational
Employment and Employment Protection, 7 INDUS. LJ. 228, 235-37 (1978); MORGENSTEIN, supra
note 275, at 27.
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is necessary to consider the issue of how to localize the employer's
conduct, particularly in view of the fact that the places of decision as
to employment abroad are often different from the place of perform-
ance. As stated earlier, lower court decisions in Cleary, Zahourek, and
Lopez indicate that the ADEA, prior to its 1984 amendment, did not
protect elder workers when their workplaces, future or present, were
located in foreign countries, even if the decision to discharge or not
to hire them was made in the United States.279 On the other hand,
Title VII was applied in Kern to the discriminatory discharge of an
employee who was supposed to work abroad with no reference to its
extraterritoriality if the decision to discharge was made within U.S.
territory. 280 These cases present the question of whether territorial
application of U.S. fair employment laws may cover the employer's
discriminatory decision in the United States as to the employee
whose work has been or is to be performed abroad. In other words,
should the place of decision, as opposed to the place of employment,
be the appropriate test in determining the applicability of territorial
fair employment laws?
The importance of the place of decision may vary with the na-
ture of the employer's conduct as well as that of the statute regulat-
ing such conduct. As to conduct that directly concerns the process
of performance of an employment contract, such as conduct affecting
the safety and health of workers, the place of decision is less relevant
than the place of performance of service. Since the purpose of statu-
tory regulation over these matters is to control actual working condi-
tions which may be harmful to workers, the law of the country where
the work is performed should provide such regulations. 28' Similarly,
the regulation of working time and wages is so closely related to the
economy of the country where the work is performed that the place
of performance is more relevant than the place of decision, 282
although it must be remembered that the place of work of an em-
ployee on a business trip abroad'usually remains the ordinary U.S.
workplace. 283 As Judge Posner stated in feiffer, "the wages a worker
is paid and the hours he works are unambiguously associated with a
place in which the work is done." 28 4 Thus, if U.S. laws regulating
279 See supra notes 132-35, 138-39 and accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text. See also Abrams v. Baylor College of
Medicine, 805 F.2d 528, 530-35 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Title VII, without reference to
the issue of extraterritoriality, where a hospital in the United States denied anesthesiolo-
gists an opportunity to participate in a certain medical program abroad). Although the
plaintiffs in these cases lived in the United States, this fact seems insufficient to distinguish
Cleary from them. Moreover, the plaintiff in Lopez also lived in the United States.
281 See MORGENSTEIN, supra note 275, at 35 ("[tlhere would seem to be no doubt that
the law of the place of the work is ... mandatory" as to occupational safety and health).
282 See id. at 75 ("[t]here is generally no objection to improving [hours of work] ... on
the mandatory legislation at the place of work").
283 See generally supra notes 258-78 and accompanying text.
284 755 F.2d at 556.
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these matters were to be applied with regard to employment abroad,
they could present conflicts with local labor policies and even distort
local economies, 28 5 even when the relevant decision regarding these
matters was made in the United States. 28 6
On the other hand, the discharge of an employee is more closely
connected to the place of decision than to the place of performance.
Wherever an employee may work, the employment contract is linked
to the place where the decision-making authority over the employ-
ment exists. While occupational safety, wages, and hours are matters
related to the performance of an employment contract, discharge is
the conduct that terminates this link, regardless of the place of per-
formance. Thus, the place of decision has the most significant con-
nection to the issue of discharge. Moreover, when the ordinary
statutory remedy for illegal discharge is a reinstatement order or an
injunction,28 7 as under Title VII and the ADEA, the focus of regula-
tion should be on the authority for decision-making over discharge
and reinstatement. Therefore, the United States has a keen interest
in regulating decision-making over discharge that takes place within
its territory. It may be argued that even discharge is related to the
local economy as are wages and working hours. However, even if
this argument provides support for the application of local fair em-
ployment laws to discharge, it does not negate the importance of the
place of decision as a basis for the application of U.S. laws.288
The place of decision is also relevant as to the regulation on
discriminatory refusal to hire employees, because the refusal to hire
concerns the conclusion, not the performance, of an employment
contract, and the employer's decision is the most significant factor.
In other words, the hiring of employees who are supposed to work
abroad forms the link of an employment contract between the em-
ployer in the United States and the employees abroad, and it is the
employer's decision not to hire such employees that prevents the
creation of this link. Thus, when a decision with respect to discharge
and refusal to hire is made within U.S. territory, the employer's con-
285 See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
286 See Title VII and the Multinational Enterprise, supra note 214, at 1482.
287 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) ("[i]f the court finds that the respondent has
intentionally engaged in... an unlawful employment practice.., the court may enjoin the
respondent from engaging in such ... practice, and order such affirmative action as may
be appropriate, which may include ... reinstatement ... with or without back pay"). See
also 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) ("the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable
relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without
limitation judgment compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion").288 Although the application of U.S. laws under the place of decision test may bring
about jurisdictional overlap with foreign laws, such an overlap will often occur with respect
to the exercise of jurisdiction based on the subjective or objective territorial principle. If
conflict arises from such an overlapping jurisdiction, the same measures as applied to ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction, e.g., a BFOQ and foreign compulsion defenses, may be avail-
able. See infra notes 308-42 and accompanying text.
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duct should be deemed to occur in the United States, even if the
actual work is performed or will be performed abroad. 289 U.S. fair
employment laws should apply to such conduct, even if they do not
have extraterritorial reach. 29° On the other hand, the place of work
test is appropriate for most other issues which arise in the course of
performance of an employment contract and which have closer con-
tact with the place of performance.2 91 These issues include working
time, wages, occupational safety and health, and harassment of
employees.
From this standpoint, the lower court decisions in Cleary,
Zahourek, and Lopez,292 which rejected the place of decision test out-
rightly, are questionable. It may be argued that the ADEA has a spe-
cific provision that exempts employees whose services are
"performed in a workplace within a foreign country." 293 This provi-
sion, however, originated in the FLSA, the subject matter of which,
working time, minimum wages, and child labor, is appropriate for
the place of work test.294 Thus, the term "workplace" may well be
understood to provide the general principle of territoriality rather
than to exclude the place of decision test. In the context of employ-
ment discrimination law like the ADEA, this provision should not be
construed to reject the place of decision test as to discharge and re-
fusal to hire.2
9 5
As a matter of course, it must be noted that the place of decision
may vary from case to case.2 96 Generally speaking, however, deci-
289 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 441, reporter's note 2, states that, for the purpose of lo-
calizing an act to be covered by foreign state compulsion defense, such localization de-
pends on "the center of gravity of the activity, i.e., on the place with which the act or
activity has the most significant connection."
290 See Notes, Same Boss, Different Rules, supra note 214, at 498. In the context of inter-
national law, the application of U.S. laws in this manner has its basis- in the subjective
territorial principle, since the discharge or refusal to hire is commenced within the United
States. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
29 1 There may be issues that arise in the course of the performance of an employment
contract but that are so similar to discharge or refusal to hire that the place of decision test
is appropriate. For example, a fundamental change in the content of a contract, such as a
transfer to another country, may be subject to the place of decision test. See Abrams v.
Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 1986) (Title VII was applied to
denial of an opportunity to participate in a certain medical program abroad).
292 See supra notes 132-35, 138-39 and accompanying text.
293 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (1988), as incorporated into the ADEA under 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b).
294 See supra notes 281-86 and accompanying text.
295 See Pfeiffer v. WM. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 556 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.)
("in the case of age discrimination the unlawful act is disconnected from the employee's
work"). It must be noted, however, that certain conduct, such as harassment because of
age, is not "disconnected from work" and is subject to the place of work test.
296 It may sometimes be difficult to specify the place where the decision took place,
especially where the personnel decision-making is carried out in a complex and bureau-
cratic manner. Although this Article cannot set forth a precise formula to localize the
place of decision, the employer's internal rule for decision-making may be given the first
weight. It must also be noted that the "decision" to which U.S. laws may apply is an indi-
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sions over employment of local workers are usually made at the local
level, while decisions regarding expatriates are often made at the
principal offices of the business. 29 7 In ARAMCO, it is not clear where
the decision to discharge the plaintiff was made. Since ARAMCO's
principal place of business is in Saudi Arabia,298 it is more likely than
not that the decision was made in Saudi Arabia, whether or not the
plaintiff was an expatriate or in a position similar to a local worker.
Thus, the Supreme Court did not foreclose the possibility of adopt-
ing the place of decision test.29 9
B. Limits of Extraterritorial Application
1. Conflicts with Foreign Laws and Customs
Congress has the power to extend the coverage of territorial
statutes for overseas application. For example, the ADEA was
amended in 1984 to apply beyond U.S. territory.300 In response to
the Supreme Court's denial of extraterritoriality of Title VII in the
ARAMCO case, a bill to amend Title VII was introduced in Congress
to extend its geographical coverage.30' These extraterritorial stat-
utes, including the possible amendment, would raise the issue of how
the conflict, if any, between them and local statutes applying to
Americans working abroad should be resolved.30 2 For example, the
vidual, specific decision as to employment, as opposed to a general decision over broad
personnel policy, which often is made at the corporate headquarters.
297 SeeJOHN DOWLING & RANDALL S. SCHULER, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 25 (1990) (When a U.S. corporation has "come of age" as a mul-
tinational, "the PCN [parent country national] workforce remains under the control of the
HRM [human resource management] department, but local employees become the re-
sponsibility of each subsidiary. Corporate HRM staff perform a monitoring role and inter-
vene in local affairs only in extreme circumstances.").
298 EEOC v. ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991).
299 See Robert Prentice, The Muddled State of Title VII's Application Abroad, 41 LAB. LJ.
633, 635 n.8 (1990) (distinguishing Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine from ARAMCO in
that the challenged employment decision in Abrams was made in the United States).
300 Older American Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat. 1792 (codified 29
U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988)).
301 H.R. REP. No. 1694, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., (1991). This bill contains the following
amendments: (1) the definition of "employee" is changed to include U.S. citizens working
in foreign countries, (2) employers are exempted from liability for otherwise prohibited
practices if they violate the law of the foreign countries where the workplace of the affected
employees is located, (3) discriminatory practices of foreign corporations which are under
the control of U.S. employers are presumed to be those of the U.S. employers, and (4) the
determination whether the U.S. employer controls a foreign corporation shall be based on
"(A) the interrelation of operations, (B) the common management, (C) the centralized
control of labor relations; and (D) the common ownership or financial control." See also
H.R. REP. No. 1741, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., (1991); H.R. REP. No. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
(1991) (Civil Rights Bill as passed by the House on June 5, 1991). This amendment ap-
pears to be modeled on the 1984 amendment of the ADEA. See supra notes 144-50 and
accompanying text.
302 Some commentators argue that the extraterritorial application of U.S. labor and
employment laws that are inconsistent with the host country's laws might cause criticism
from those countries. See Zimmerman, supra note 148, at 120-24; Notes, Recent Develop-
ments-Age Discrimination, supra note 152, at 216-18. But, at least as to laws for equal employ-
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Labour Standards Law ofJapan prohibits an employer from having a
large percentage of its female employees work longer than a certain
amount of time on holidays,3 0 3 or at night, from 10:00 p.m. until
5:00 a.m. 304 Moreover, an employer in Japan is prohibited from re-
quiring pregnant workers, or female workers in general, to work cer-
tain jobs that are harmful to the functions of pregnancy, childbirth,
and nursing, such as those at workplaces with lead exposure.30 5 Em-
ployment practices of U.S. corporations in Japan conforming to
these Japanese regulations would violate the possible amendment to
Title VII which would give it extraterritorial reach, especially in view
of the recent Supreme Court decision in UA W v. Johnson Controls,
ment opportunities, such criticism seems less likely to arise so long as the application of
U.S. laws are limited to American citizens employed by American corporations. See Notes,
Same Boss, Different Rules, supra note 214, at 510; Bellace, supra note 252, at 20.
303 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 64-2 of the law provides:
[1 ] An employer shall not have women over 18 full years of age engaged
in enterprises under item I through 5 [i.e., manufacturing, mining, construc-
tion, transportation, and freight industries] of article 8 work more than six
hours of overtime work per week or more than 150 hours of overtime work
per year, or work on rest days ... ; [proviso omitted]. [2] With respect to
women over 18 full years of age engaged in enterprises other than those
under preceding paragraph, an employer ... shall not have overtime work
for a period measured in weeks - as established by ordinance but not to
exceed a four-week period - in excess of the number of the hours derived by
multiplying the number of hours established by ordinance, which shall be no
fewer than 6 hours nor greater than 12 hours, by the number of weeks in
such period; shall not have overtime work for a one-year period in excess of
the number of hours established by ordinance, which shall be no fewer than
150 hours nor greater than 300 hours; and shall not have work on rest days
during a four-week period in excess of the number of rest days established by
ordinance.
LABOUR Laws OF JAPAN 1990, supra note 266, at 75. Paragraph 4 of article 64-3, however,
provides that the above paragraphs "shall not apply to persons over 18 full years of age, as
specified by ordinance, who are in positions involving the ordering and directing of the
performance of the work by workers, or who are engaged in work which requires profes-
sional knowledge or skills." Id. at 76.
304 Paragraph I of article 64-3 provides that "[a]n employer shall not employ a woman
over 18 full years of age between the hours of 10 p.m. and 5 a.m." Id. at 76.
305 Article 64-5 provides:
[1] An employer shall not employ a pregnant woman or women within
one year after childbirth (hereinafter referred to as "expectant and nursing
mothers") in the handling of heavy materials, work in places where harmful
gas is generated, or work injurious to pregnancy, childbirth, nursing and the
like.
[2] With respect to work injurious to the function involved in pregnancy
and childbirth, the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be applied
mutatis mutandis by ordinance to women other than expectant and nursing
mothers.
[3] The scope of work under the preceding paragraphs and the scope of
persons who shall not be employed in such work shall be specified by
ordinance.
Id. at 77. Under paragraph 2 of this article, coupled with articles 9 and 10 ofJoshi Rodo
Kijun Kisoku (Enforcement Regulation on Labor Standards of Women) (Ordinance of the
Ministry of Labour No. 3, 1986), an employer is prohibited from having its female employ-
ees work (1) in a job that requires carrying heavy objects and (2) at the workplace where
workers are exposed to lead, mercury and other similar injurious substances.
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Inc. 306 This case held that a fetal protection policy which excludes
most of the female workers from jobs involving actual or potential
exposure to lead violated Title VII.
In addition, even if foreign laws do not compel discrimination,
cultural differences or social norms abroad sometimes induce em-
ployers to implement disparate treatment of a particular group of
employees. For example, employers may assert that they would re-
fuse promotion of women to positions requiring negotiation with
foreign customers who are hostile to female negotiators. What de-
fenses are available for employers faced with such a dilemma?30 7
2. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
a. Legal Restriction on the Job
Section 703(e) of Title VII provides that it is not unlawful for an
employer to engage in disparate treatment of its employees on the
basis of religion, sex, or national origin if these factors are "bona fide
occupational qualifications"(BFOQs),308 The ADEA has a similar
provision on age discrimination. 30 9 Thus, the issue is whether the
host country's law requiring discrimination constitutes a BFOQ and
therefore provides a defense for the employer. In Kern v. Dynalectron
Corp.,310 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas
held that being Moslem is a BFOQ for pilots whose job requires
them to fly into Mecca, since Saudi Arabian law provides that non-
Moslems who enter into Mecca shall be beheaded. However, the
Supreme Court in Johnson Controls declared that the BFOQ defense
must be based on the employee's ability to perform the job in ques-
tion.3 11 It is argued that compulsion by foreign laws does not qualify
as a BFOQdefense since such compulsion is not related to the ability
of an employee. 312
However, when a foreign law actually forbids an employee to
carry out his or her job, the employee lacks the ability to perform the
job. Although such legal restrictions may not be related to the at-
tributes of the employee, there is no reason to exclude a legal restric-
tion on the employee's behavior from the concept of "ability." This
point is illustrated by several lower court decisions which have ac-
knowledged that the consideration of the privacy interests of third
306 111 S.'Ct. 1196 (1991).
307 This issue arises with regard to statutes that have no extraterritorial reach when
they are applied to employment abroad under the place of decision test. See supra notes
279-99 and accompanying text.
308 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1988).
309 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1988).
310 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
311 UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 1196 (1991).
312 E.g., Notes, Equal Employment Opportunity Abroad, supra note 218, at 1309.
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persons may be a basis for the BFOQdefense.3 13 In Fesel v. Masonic
Home,3 14 the court upheld a residential retirement home's defense
that its refusal to hire a male nurse was justified by the privacy inter-
ests of the female guests whom its nurses were to attend. Although
these decisions usually require employers to make reasonable efforts
to avoid conflicts between privacy interests and equality in employ-
ment,3 1 5 it is clear that restrictions which are based on the law of
privacy may provide a basis for a BFOQ.
It must be noted that a BFOQ defense is not always available
when a foreign law compels discrimination. For a BFOQ defense to
stand, the discrimination must be "reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation" of the "particular business or enterprise."3 1 6 Thus,
the employer must prove not only that it has reasonable cause to
believe that all or substantially all within a protected group cannot
perform the job at issue safely and efficiently, but also that the job
qualification is related to the "essence" of its business.3 17  The
BFOQ defense is available only when the essence of the business is
undermined by hiring the person of the protected group.3 18 Thus, a
Japanese law restricting women's working time does not always con-
stitute a BFOQ.
Furthermore, courts should consider whether the employer
made a reasonable attempt to avoid conflicts between the foreign
regulation and equality in employment, as in cases involving a third
person's privacy interests.3 1 9 Without this effort, the employer's dis-
parate treatment may not be justified as "reasonably necessary. 3 20
The Kern court upheld the BFOQ defense based on the finding that
the essence of the employer's business, was to. provide pilots whose
313 See BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 354
(2d ed. 1983); Deborah A. Calloway, Equal Employment and Third Party Privacy Interests: an
Analytical Framework for Reconciling Competing Rights, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 328 (1985).
314 Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978).
315 E.g., Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1370-71 (11 th Cir. 1982).
316 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e); 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988).
317 UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 1205 (1991). See also Dothard v. Rawl-
inson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977).
318 As for wage discrimination because of sex, the Equal Pay Act, as well as the Benett
Amendment to Title VII, allows an employer to raise as a defense that the disparate treat-
ment under attack is based on "any other factor than sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d)(1) (1988).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). Under these provisions, the inquiry whether the disparate
treatment is necessary for the essence of the employer's business does not seem to be
required, although the "other factor" under the Equal Pay Act and the Benett Amendment
must be a "reasonable" factor based on legitimate business reasons. See Kouba v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1982). Likewise, section 4(f) of the ADEA permits
differentiation based on reasonable factors other than age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988).
319 See Bellace, supra note 252, at 20 ("[clourts should permit evidence to determine
(1) whether it would be impossible for the plaintiff to perform the job adequately, and (2)
whether the employer could have taken reasonable action to minimize the unfavorable
response the plaintiff was expected to encounter").
320 See, e.g., Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
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duty was to fly helicopters to Mecca as a means of transportation for
a project carried out by another company.32' Thus, being Moslem
was "an absolute prerequisite" for the pilot's job.3 2 2 On the other
hand, in Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 32s in which a U.S. hospital
refused to send its Jewish anesthesiologists to Saudi Arabia for car-
diovascular services, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit .re-
jected the employer's BFOQ argument.3 24 This was because the
employer did not take the appropriate steps to confirm the actual
policy of Saudi Arabia toward Jewish doctors in the program or alle-
viate the effects of its discriminatory policy.3 25
b. Customer's Preference
Another issue associated with the BFOQ defense is whether it
can be based upon a foreign customer's preference. In Fernandez v.
Wynn Oil Co. ,326 the Ninth Circuit rejected such a defense against Ti-
tle VII claims. In this case the employer argued that its refusal to
promote a female administrative assistant to Director of Interna-
tional Operation was due to the hostility of its customers in Latin
America toward female executives.32 7 Reversing the district court,
which upheld the BFOQdefense,3 28 the Ninth Circuit followed other
circuits in denying that a customer's preference can constitute a
BFOQ in the context of domestic employment.32 9
It is argued that requirements for the BFOQ defense regarding
employment abroad should be less strict than requirements regard-
ing domestic employment, so that a foreign customer's preference
may, in appropriate circumstances, constitute a BFOQ.330 This view
stresses that the United States, or employers in the United States, are
in no position to change a foreign nation's discriminatory atti-
tudes,33' as compared to American attitudes which Title VII and
other equal employment laws are meant to change.332 Although
such consideration is not without merit, it may be taken into account
even under the traditional approach in the domestic context. If a
foreign customer's preference is so strong that all or substantially all
321 Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196, 1198, 1200 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
322 Id. at 1202.
323 Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986).
324 Id. at 535.
325 Id.
326 Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981). Since the place of
decision as well as the employee's residence was in the United States, the court did not
address the issue of the extraterritoriality of Title VII.
327 Id. at 1276.
328 20 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1162 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
329 See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
330 Bellace, supra note 252, at 23. See also Kirschner, supra note 219, at 404.
331 Bellace, supra note 252, at 23.
332 See Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389.
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of the protected group cannot perform the job in question, and the
essence of the employer's business would be undermined by hiring
the person of the protected group,333 then the BFOQ defense may
stand.33 4
3. Foreign Compulsion
As stated in Part 11,33 5 the United States may not require compli-
ance with its laws in another country if the compliance results in the
violation of that country's laws. Based on this principle, the 1984
amendment to the ADEA provides an employer with a defense when
compliance with the ADEA as to its employees in a foreign workplace
"would cause [the] employer ... to violate the laws of the country in
which such workplace is located."33 6 The purpose of this provision
is, together with the limitation of the ADEA's extraterritorial cover-
age to U.S. citizens employed by U.S. employers or foreign subsidi-
aries under their control, to respect sovereignties of foreign
countries and avoid conflicts with their laws.33 7
It must be noted that the majority of such conflicts may provide
a basis for BFOQs.3 3 8 If a foreign law compels U.S. employers to
discriminate against a certain category of employees by reason of fac-
tors that are impermissible under U.S. laws, such employees are not
qualified to perform their jobs in the foreign country. Since an em-
ployer asserting the foreign compulsion defense should prove that
the violation of the domestic law was caused by "actual compulsion,"
the employer is required to make a good-faith effort to avoid viola-
333 The acceptance of the BFOQ defense by the district court in Fernandez has little
evidentiary support, since, as the Ninth Circuit correctly pointed out, the testimony it re-
lied on did not show that hiring a female director for business in Latin America would
undermine the essence of the employer's business. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d
1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981).
334 See Debra A. Stegura, The Biases of Customers in a Host Country as a Bona Fide Occupa-
tional Qualification: Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 335, 355 (1984). See also
Notes, Employment Discrimination-U.S. Employers in Foreign Countries: Is Customer's Preference a
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification?-Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 31 KAN. L. REv. 183, 197
(1982) ("[t]he courts and the EEOC appear willing to extend statutory protection for em-
ployment discrimination based on sex when a practice is so taboo that the prejudices
against it is unalterable").
335 See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
336 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1988).
337 See S. REP. No. 98-467, supra note 147, at 27, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3000.
As for the foreign compulsion defense in general, it is pointed out that, in order for the
defense to succeed, the interests of the foreign nation regulating the U.S. national's con-
duct should be greater than those of the United States. See Comments, Foreign Compulsion,
supra note 67, at 375; Pierre Vogelenzang, Foreign Sovereign Compulsion in American Antitrust
Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 131, 146 (1980). Congress, however, by amending the ADEA, has
made this defense available for U.S. employers without engaging in such interest
balancing.
338 See Comments, Foreign Compulsion, supra note 67, at 392 n. 132 (preferring the for-
eign compulsion defense to the BFOQdefense, while acknowledging the similarity of anal-
ysis between them). See also Title VII and the Multinational Enterprise, supra note 214, at 1491
n.150.
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tion of foreign laws.3 3 9 This is almost identical to the requirement
for the BFOQ defense based on the conflict with foreign laws, which
is that the employer make a reasonable effort to avoid conflicts with
foreign regulations. s40
However, there may be some areas in which only the foreign
compulsion defense is available. While the BFOQ defense requires
that the employer prove the essence of its business would be under-
mined without discriminating against the employee, the foreign com-
pulsion doctrine exempts the employer from U.S. laws if the conduct
which would otherwise be impermissible under U.S. laws is com-
pelled by foreign laws, regardless of the effect on the essence of the
employer's business. For example, suppose Title VII is amended to
have extraterritorial effect. When a U.S. employer orders only its
male American employees in Japan to work overtime, which women
are prohibited from doing under Japanese law, 34' the employer may
raise a foreign compulsion defense to the claim of discrimination
against its female American employees in Japan with regard to the
loss of opportunities for overtime compensation. 342 The employer
would not have to prove that such discrimination is reasonably nec-
essary to the essence of its business.
V. Conclusion
In light of the Supreme Court decision in ARAMCO, it appears
settled that U.S. fair employment laws do not apply beyond U.S. ter-
ritory unless congressional intent to the contrary is clearly shown in
the statute at issue. However, the majority's reasoning is not persua-
sive, because it relied on the strong presumption against extraterri-
toriality without inquiring intothe legislative history of Title VII. On
the other hand, it is far less settled whether U.S. territorial statutes
may apply when an employee is abroad on a business trip or when
the decision to discharge or refuse to hire an individual working or
supposed to work in a foreign country is made within U.S. territory.
This Article answered both of these questions affirmatively, based on
the notion of the extended U.S. workplace and the place of decision
test respectively. As to the limitation of extraterritorial application,
it is similarly unsettled what defense is available to an employer who
faces conflicts between U.S. and foreign laws as well as local customs.
This Article suggests that such employer may assert a BFOQdefense
when the essence of its business would be undermined in the ab-
sence of discriminatory conduct, and the employer has made a rea-
339 See Comments, Foreign Compulsion, supra note 67, at 388-89.
340 See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
341 See supra notes 303-04 and accompanying text.
342 This presupposes that the employer has made a reasonable effort to accommodate
conflict of laws. In such a case as above, however, there appears to be little room for such
accommodation.
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sonable effort to avoid conflicts with foreign norms. Another
suggestion is that the employer may assert the foreign compulsion
defense when the foreign law constitutes actual compulsion, though
the coverage of this defense often overlaps *with that of the BFOQ
defense.
Although this Article has focused on the coverage of regulatory
statutes for fair employment, it must be noted that there is another
body of law that may apply to employment relations-the law of em-
ployment contract. In general, the issue of which law governs an em-
ployment contract in an international context should be discussed
under the framework of conflict of laws.3 43 This issue is fundamen-
tally different from that of the extraterritoriality of regulatory stat-
utes, though an approach similar to that of conflict of laws has
sometimes been taken for the latter issue.3 44 In view of the recent
remarkable development in employment contract laws in the United
States, it is likely that courts will render interesting decisions with
respect to conflict of laws in this area,3 45 which in turn will provide
good opportunities for further analysis of international employment
laws.
Postscript
On November 21, 1991, President Bush signed the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 * into law. Section 109 of this Act ammends Title VII
and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to extend coverage
beyond U.S. territory with respect to American citizens employed by
American employers and foreign corporations controlled by Ameri-
can employers. Entities subject to such extraterritorial application
may raise a foreign compulsion defense when compliance causes
such entities to violate the law of such foreign countries. These
amendments are mostly identical with the provisions of the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act regarding its extraterritoriality.
Since the amendments shall not apply to conduct that occurred
before the enactment of this Act, the discussion in this Article re-
mains intact with respect to such conduct.
343 For a comparative research on this topic, see MORGENSTEIN, supra note 275.
344 See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582-93 (1953) (the application of the
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. App. § 688 (1988), to foreign seamen employed on foreign vessels
was rejected as a result of balancing of "connecting factors" such as place of wrongful act,
law of the flag, nationality of the injured seamen and the shipowner, place of contract etc.).
See also HENRY J. STEIMER & DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNAT1ONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 846-49,
865-82 (3d ed. 1986). But see Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc., 932 F.2d 218, 225 (3d
Cir. 1991) ("the applicability of FLSA is a matter of statutory interpretation rather than
choice of law analysis").
345 See David M. Kroeger, Welcome to the Big World: The Emerging Tort of the Public Policy
Exception to Employment at Will and its Chaotic Encounter With Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REV. 795 (1989).
$ Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 931 (1991).
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